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Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of
Pinkerton
Abstract

This article considers what limits the constitution places on holding someone criminally liable for another's
conduct. While vicarious criminal liability is often criticized, there is no doubt that it is constitutionally
permissible as a general matter. Under the long-standing felony murder doctrine, for example, if A and B rob a
bank and B shoots and kills a security guard, A can be held criminally liable for the murder. What if, however,
A was not involved in the robbery but instead had a completely separate conspiracy with B to distribute
cocaine? What relationship, if any, does the constitution require between A's conduct and B's crimes in order
to hold A liable for them? It is clear A could not be punished for B's crimes simply because they are friends.
This is true even if A suspected B was involved in criminal activity. Beyond this, however, the boundaries are
surprisingly uncertain. Though commentators have long debated the wisdom of vicarious criminal liability as
a policy matter, the question of whether the constitution constrains the government's ability to punish one
person for another's crimes has gone largely unexamined. The lack of attention to this topic is all the more
glaring in light of a small but steady line of cases holding that, in the context of conspiracy law, due process
forbids vicarious liability for crimes that are not both (a) reasonably foreseeable and (b) done in furtherance
of the conspiracy (these are the so-called "Pinkerton limits"). Despite these cases, however, courts continue to
permit holding defendants strictly liable for another's conduct in other areas of criminal law, such as felony
murder. If negligence is constitutionally required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy why is it not for felony
murder vicarious liability? This article aims to examine the extent to which substantive due process limits
vicarious criminal liability through the lens of cases that have held Pinkerton's test to be a constitutional
minimum in the conspiracy context. First, I consider why courts have treated the Pinkerton test as a
constitutional floor and attempt to build a more coherent approach for understanding these cases based on
the due process "personal guilt" concept. Second, I explore how these cases might impact other areas of
criminal law using three examples: the definition of "scope" in conspiracy law, the felony murder doctrine, and
the "material support" provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Though a clear and
thorough account of personal guilt and vicarious liability under the constitution is likely to remain elusive for
some time, I hope that this article will help start a broader and much-needed discussion about constitutional
constraints on vicarious criminal liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Shortly after deciding that the tranquil life of the academy just isn’t
satisfying my inner need for risk and adventure, I call up my friend
Dave and convince him to rob a bank with me. Since I came up with
the idea, I tell Dave that it is only fair he do all the legwork to prepare
for the robbery. To my pleasant surprise, he agrees and quickly
begins to make the necessary arrangements, leaving me free to relax
and catch up on my blog reading, ignorant of what exactly it is that
he is doing. In the course of his preparations, Dave commits some
*

Visiting Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I would like to
thank Laura Berg, Robert M. Chesney, Greg David, Deven Desai, Anders Kaye, Linda
Keller, Jessica Lowe, Aaron Marcus, Sandy Rierson, Steve Semeraro, Jeff Slattery, Ben
Templin, Kaimi Wenger, Claire Wright, and all the participants in the Thomas
Jefferson School of Law Junior Faculty Writing Workshop. None should be held
vicariously liable for any errors, which are, of course, mine alone.
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additional crimes: he steals a vintage Buick to use as our getaway car,
buys a few weapons on the black market, and, while he is purchasing
the weapons, decides to get some marijuana for his personal use. A
couple of nights before the robbery, Dave goes to a bar and foolishly
tells the bartender about our plan. The bartender tells the police
and they bust us before we’re able to rob the bank. As a result, I’m
on the hook for conspiracy to rob the bank, and, vicariously, for the
car theft and the weapons, but not for the marijuana. This is
because, under the rule famously announced in Pinkerton v. United
1
States, a conspirator is liable for any crimes committed by his coconspirators that were both reasonably foreseeable and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and Dave’s marijuana purchase was
neither. Indeed, even if I knew with certainty that Dave was going to
buy the marijuana, I could not be held vicariously liable for it, since
2
his marijuana purchase didn’t further the conspiracy.
Though critics consistently deride Pinkerton as overly broad, its
restrictions on vicarious liability seem almost robust compared to
some other areas of criminal law. Under the felony murder rule, for
example, if Dave and I had been working as a pick-pocketing team
and he unexpectedly went berserk and stabbed and killed one of our
targets, I could be convicted of murder even if the killing was not
3
reasonably foreseeable. What accounts for this distinction? What, if
anything, prevents the government from holding conspirators
vicariously liable for all crimes committed by their partners,
regardless of whether the crimes further the conspiracy or are
foreseeable? To put the question more directly: are Pinkerton’s
limitations on vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators
constitutionally mandated and, if so, why don’t they seem to apply to
other areas of criminal law?
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the answer to whether the
Constitution requires Pinkerton’s limits seems to be yes. Dating back
to the mid-1970s, every court to consider the issue has held or
strongly implied that the Pinkerton rule is indeed constitutionally

1. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
2. See United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
“knowledge of another [conspiracy] participant’s criminal acts is not enough to hold
the defendant responsible for those acts”).
3. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV.
59, 97–98 (2004) (discussing a felony murder case from 1786 where a young member
of a pick-pocketing ring was held vicariously liable for another member’s murder).
But see id. at 98 (noting that such broad liability was the exception at common law
and arguing that common law felony murder was, in general, significantly more
constrained than is commonly believed).
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derived. A number have even indicated that substantive due process
goes further by limiting vicarious liability for defendants who played
only a small role in the conspiracy even if the Pinkerton requirements
5
have been met.
To be sure, courts have found constitutional
6
violations in only a few cases and the Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue, but the notion that Pinkerton’s rule is required by
substantive due process appears to be a relatively uncontroversial
7
proposition among federal circuit and district courts.
Despite
agreement on this basic proposition, however, courts have failed to
provide much in the way of analysis or explanation as to why and in
what way Pinkerton is grounded in substantive due process. Many
decisions provide only a paragraph or two of analysis to support their
8
assertion that the Pinkerton rule is constitutionally based. Of the
courts that have considered the issue in greater depth, none have
outlined a clear method for applying Pinkerton as a decision of
constitutional law.
Scholars, meanwhile, have overlooked the courts’ treatment of
Pinkerton as constitutional law almost entirely. Indeed, for one of the
most famous cases in all of criminal law, Pinkerton is surprisingly
9
under-examined in general. Of the handful of major articles written
4. See United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196 (1st Cir. 2000)
(discussing cases addressing the constitutional basis of Pinkerton); infra Part III
(analyzing courts’ treatment of Pinkerton as constitutionally required).
5. See United States v. Alverez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e are
mindful of the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases
involving attenuated relationships between the conspirator and the substantive
crime.”); see also id. at 850 n.25 (“In our view, the liability of such ‘minor’ participants
must rest on a more substantial foundation than the mere whim of the prosecutor.”);
Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy
Liability, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 124–33, 147–52 (2006) (discussing cases and arguing
that substantive due process should preclude Pinkerton liability for defendants who
played a minor or attenuated role in the conspiracy).
6. See United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing
conviction for knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon based on vicarious liability
because it was “an unwarranted, and possibly unconstitutional, expansion of the
Pinkerton doctrine”); United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“Assuming, under Pinkerton, that responsibility for both the predicate offense prong
and use of a weapon prong of section 924(c) may be established on the basis of
foreseeability alone, in Leticia’s case, foreseeability has been stretched beyond the
limits of due process.”).
7. See infra Part III (discussing courts’ treatment of Pinkerton limits as
constitutionally mandated).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
“the due process limitations inherent in Pinkerton” without discussion of these
limitations).
9. A Lexis Shepard’s report reveals only 193 law review articles that have cited
Pinkerton since 1980. By way of comparison, the equally famous Commerce Clause
case Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) decided four years before Pinkerton, has
been cited in 1699 law review articles during that same period according to Shepard’s.
Similarly, a Lexis search for “atleast10(Pinkerton)” yields only fifty law review articles,
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on conspiracy law since Pinkerton was decided, none has had Pinkerton
as its primary topic and only two have given the case detailed
10
treatment. Most of the commentary that has focused on Pinkerton
has been aimed at critiquing or, less commonly, defending the
soundness of holding defendants vicariously liable for the acts of
11
their co-conspirators.
In a recent and notable exception, one
commentator relied on cases holding Pinkerton to be constitutionally
required to argue in favor of a due process-based rule that would
restrict vicarious liability for conspirators who are “attenuated” from
12
the conspiracy.
However, the underlying questions of why
Pinkerton’s “reasonably foreseeable” and “in furtherance of” formula
may be constitutionally required and what cases that have adopted
this position might mean for other areas of criminal law remain
13
essentially unexamined by scholars. Thus, although the courts that

a number of which are unrelated to the conspiracy case. Indeed, scholarship on the
law of conspiracy generally has been sparse. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1311 (2003) (noting the lack of scholarship on criminal
conspiracy law).
10. In his significant article on conspiracy in 2003, Neal Katyal posited that only
two major articles on conspiracy had been written since 1959. See id. at 1311 n.8
(citing Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405
(1959); Philip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1137
(1973)). None of these articles discuss Pinkerton in any detail. To Katyal’s list of
major articles, one might add the influential 1959 Harvard Law Review Note on
conspiracy and Paul Robinson’s 1984 article Imputed Criminal Liability, both of which
address Pinkerton in some detail but do not focus on the case. See Developments in the
Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 993–1000 (1959) [hereinafter
Criminal Conspiracy] (analyzing and critiquing Pinkerton); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed
Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984) (discussing different theories that may
justify imputed liability and applying them to various doctrines including Pinkerton).
11. See, e.g., Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998 (“No court which has taken
the Pinkerton approach has offered an adequate rationale for convicting a conspirator
for the crimes of his associates.”); Katyal, supra note 9, at 1372–75 (providing a
functional defense of Pinkerton but acknowledging that other considerations such as
unfair discrimination “may very well be a reason to reject Pinkerton or to take other
mitigating steps”); Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an
Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 7 (1992)
(criticizing Pinkerton liability because it “permits the government to hold a defendant
criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless
of actual knowledge, intent, or participation”) (citation omitted); Matthew A. Pauley,
The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 42 (arguing that Pinkerton is not
an “aberration” but rather “is fundamentally consistent with American law in many
ways”).
12. See Noferi, supra note 5, at 147–54 (arguing for limiting Pinkerton liability on
the basis of “attenuation”).
13. Though Mark Noferi provides a thorough and helpful history of cases
discussing Pinkerton and substantive due process, he does not analyze the
constitutional dimensions of Pinkerton itself or the implications for other areas of
criminal law. See id. at 140–41 (arguing that “cases equating ‘foreseeability’ with ‘due
process’ appear misleading” to his task of exploring limits on Pinkerton itself because
they provide “little more than a restatement of Pinkerton’s ‘foreseeability’ test”).
Instead Noferi focuses his analysis exclusively on whether the cases support a new
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have addressed the issue are in general agreement that Pinkerton’s
limitations on vicarious liability are constitutionally based, there is
still no framework for analyzing due process issues in vicarious
liability cases, little understanding of the reasons for treating the
Pinkerton limits as constitutionally mandated, or even an active
discussion about these important questions. As Judge Nancy Gertner
recently put it: “In short, the law has not yet developed clear and
14
cogent standards to assess the outer due process limits of Pinkerton.”
The lack of attention paid to the ascendance of Pinkerton as a
constitutionally based decision among federal courts is all the more
surprising given that its rule is now one of the few that appears to
place constitutional restrictions on the government’s ability to define
15
crimes.
No court or commentator has addressed how the
recognition of Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally required might
impact other areas of substantive criminal law. If Pinkerton’s
16
limitations on vicarious liability—modest though they may be —are a
constitutional floor, however, the potential impact may be significant.
The “reasonably foreseeable” requirement, for instance, imposes a
minimum mens rea of negligence for vicarious liability stemming
from a conspiracy, but the Supreme Court has “affirmed and
17
reaffirmed that strict liability as a general matter is constitutional.”
Indeed, as noted above, a defendant can be convicted of felony
murder based on a killing committed by her co-felon even if the
18
killing was accidental and not reasonably foreseeable. If negligence
attenuation limit on Pinkerton for defendants who play a minor role in a conspiracy
and what such a limitation might look like. Id. at 147–52.
14. United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67–68 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003).
15. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997) (“Constitutionally speaking, substantive
criminal law is almost entirely unregulated.”).
16. Indeed, discussing Pinkerton as a rule limiting vicarious liability may seem
somewhat ironic given that the decision itself represented a significant expansion on
vicarious liability when it was issued. See infra Part I (discussing the creation of
Pinkerton liability). Nevertheless, the phrase “Pinkerton limits” is helpful and
appropriate in this context as this Article examines whether the Pinkerton rule could
be constitutionally reduced (or eliminated) or whether it sets minimum
requirements for vicarious liability under the Due Process Clause.
17. Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828, 832 (1999);
see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (noting that,
though strict liability is disfavored, it “[does] not invariably offend constitutional
requirements”).
18. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 557 (4th ed. 2006)
(“[T]he felony murder rule authorizes strict liability for a death that results from
commission of a felony.”); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony Murder
Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429,
1438 (1994) (“The broadest version of the doctrine makes even an accidental
killing—one caused by nonnegligent conduct—murder.”). Under the law in most
states, so long as the killing is committed in furtherance of a group of felonies set by
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is constitutionally required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy why is
it not for felony murder vicarious liability?
Viewing Pinkerton’s test as a constitutional minimum also raises
questions within conspiracy law itself about the current approach to
defining the “scope” of a conspiratorial agreement. In this area,
courts continue to follow an approach developed before the rise of
Pinkerton liability, which analyzes the scope of a conspiracy from an
evidentiary perspective and limits it only where a mass trial might
unfairly influence the jury. As a result, a defendant can be convicted
of being part of a large conspiracy, even if he is unaware of its
breadth or details, so long as he knows the essential nature of the
group’s plan. When this ex-post definition of a conspiracy’s scope is
used to expand a defendant’s substantive liability, it can result in
strict liability for crimes that were not foreseeable to her or done in
furtherance of her agreement.
To take another example, one particularly controversial provision
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),
which has gained prominence for making it a crime to provide
“material support” to a “foreign terrorist organization,” seems to do
away with both of Pinkerton’s requirements by mandating added
criminal liability “if the death of any person results” from the material
19
support.
Litigants and commentators have argued that the
provision is unconstitutional because it criminalizes support of
foreign organizations that engage in peaceful and legitimate
endeavors (such as providing humanitarian aid), thereby infringing
on rights under both the First Amendment and the Due Process
20
The Pinkerton limits may provide new insight into the
Clause.
questions about AEDPA’s “material support” provision that could

the legislature, it constitutes felony murder. See Tomkovicz, supra, at 1434 (noting
that most American jurisdictions have adopted this approach to felony murder). But
see generally Binder, supra note 3 (arguing such broad felony murder liability was, by
far, the exception at common law).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000). In full, the provision reads:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of
any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
Id.
20. See, e.g., David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the
Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 205 (noting that the U.S. government
defends AEDPA on the grounds that restrictions on financial contributions to a
political group is not direct association, subject to strict scrutiny, but is a regulation
of conduct that only incidentally affects the right to association).
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help to reduce some of the confusion among the courts that have
21
considered its constitutionality.
This Article aims to examine the extent to which substantive due
process limits vicarious criminal liability through the lens of cases that
have held Pinkerton’s test to be a constitutional minimum in the
conspiracy context. The Article does not directly address how the
prevailing methods for analyzing fundamental rights questions would
22
treat vicarious criminal liability, whether the Pinkerton rule is
desirable as a matter of policy or criminal theory, or whether the
Constitution might place limits on vicarious liability for the acts of coconspirators beyond those in Pinkerton. Rather, my goals here are,
first, to examine why courts consider the Pinkerton test to be a
constitutional floor and build a more coherent approach for
understanding Pinkerton’s limits as constitutional requirements on
vicarious liability; and, second, to explore how this more detailed
23
account of “the due process limitations inherent in Pinkerton” might
impact other areas of criminal law. In so doing, I hope also to spark a
broader conversation about the extent to which the concept of
personal guilt under the Due Process Clause might constrain
substantive criminal law.
Part I of this Article examines the Pinkerton decision and the rise of
its two-pronged test in state and federal courts. Part II provides a
history of the decisions that have found Pinkerton’s test to be a
constitutionally required limit on vicarious liability for the acts of coconspirators. Part III takes a closer look at the constitutional
dimensions of Pinkerton by drawing upon the “personal guilt” due
process concept that the Supreme Court has recognized in the
context of another area of vicarious criminal liability. In the process,
this Part will seek to develop a clearer framework for understanding
and applying the Pinkerton test as a rule of constitutional law. Part IV
discusses some of the areas of substantive criminal law that might be
affected by the account of Pinkerton as constitutional law advanced in
Part III. The examination in Part IV is not meant to be exhaustive,
21. See infra Part IV.C (examining AEDPA as another area of criminal law to
which vicarious liability applies).
22. For example, this Article does not thoroughly analyze whether Pinkerton’s
“formula [rises] to the level of [a] fundamental principle, so as to limit the
traditional recognition of a State’s capacity to define crimes and offenses.” Clark v.
Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2719 (2006); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43
(1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that a state’s ability to carry out and define crimes
“is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
23. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000).
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but instead provides a window into some of the issues that courts’
treatment of the “reasonably foreseeable” and “in furtherance of”
requirements as constitutionally required raises. To that end, this
Part provides an overview of the potential implications of Pinkerton’s
limits in three distinct areas: (1) the definition of the “scope” of an
unlawful agreement in a conspiracy; (2) felony murder vicarious
liability; and (3) AEDPA’s “material support” provision. Part V
concludes that recognition of Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally
required poses difficult challenges for broad applications of vicarious
liability in other areas of criminal law. These issues deserve greater
attention than they have received. In particular, courts that have
held Pinkerton to be based in substantive due process should work in
future cases toward creating a clear framework that would allow the
principles guiding this rule to be consistently applied across cases.
I.

THE STRANGE RISE OF “PINKERTON LIABILITY”
24

Pinkerton v. United States is one of the most well known cases in
criminal law today. As anyone who has taken criminal law will recall,
under Pinkerton a defendant may be held liable for any crimes
committed by her co-conspirators that were (1) reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant and (2) done in furtherance of the
25
illegal agreement. Indeed, the case is so famously linked to this rule
that most courts refer to vicarious liability for the acts of co26
conspirators as “Pinkerton liability.” It is surprising, then, that the
Pinkerton opinion itself seemed to recite the rule almost as an after
thought.
Brothers Walter and Daniel Pinkerton lived two hundred yards
from each other on Daniel’s farm, where they were engaged in an
ongoing illegal whiskey business that had resulted in each being
27
convicted “many times” of violating state liquor laws. Both brothers
were charged and convicted of conspiracy to violate the tax code, as
28
well as a number of substantive counts of tax evasion. There was,
however, “no evidence to show that Daniel participated directly in the
24. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
25. Id. at 647–48.
26. See United States v. Radermacher, 474 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (7th Cir. 2007)
(discussing Pinkerton liability); State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1148
(Ariz. 1992) (“The liability of an accused for acts committed by co-conspirators is
often called ‘Pinkerton’ liability, after the case in which the United States Supreme
Court recognized the doctrine as part of federal criminal law and upheld it against a
double jeopardy challenge.”).
27. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 640
(1946).
28. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
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29

commission of the substantive offenses” or even knew of their
commission—the substantive offenses had been committed by Walter
alone.
Daniel challenged his convictions for the substantive offenses by
relying on a 1940 case from the Third Circuit, which held that a
defendant could be convicted of a crime committed by her coconspirator only if she had directly participated in or aided and
30
abetted it. The Third Circuit reasoned that holding a conspirator
liable for all crimes committed during the course of the conspiracy,
as the government urged, was not authorized by the federal criminal
code’s provision on aiding and abetting liability. Under that statute,
“[w]hoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined
in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
31
induces, or procures its commission, is a principal.”
Justice Douglas, writing for the Pinkerton majority, rejected Daniel’s
32
argument in a short two-paragraph discussion. Douglas based his
analysis almost entirely on the rule that, in a criminal conspiracy, “an
overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new
33
agreement specifically directed to that act.” According to the overt
act rule, established before Pinkerton, Conspirator A’s act can be used
to satisfy the overt act element of a conspiracy charge against
Conspirator B (the other element, of course, is that the defendant
34
intentionally entered into the criminal agreement). “The governing
principle is the same,” Douglas reasoned, “when the substantive
offense is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the
35
unlawful project.” He concluded that, “[i]f [the overt act element]
can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the
29. Id. at 645.
30. See United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745, 747–48 (3d Cir. 1940) (holding that
the federal statute provides for criminal liability as a principal of a substantive offense
only for those who directly commit the crime or aid or abet it).
31. Id. at 747 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 550 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)));
see also id. (“It was not sufficient merely to prove that he was a member of the
conspiracy . . . and that in the course of that conspiracy those particular crimes were
committed by other conspirators.”).
32. 328 U.S. at 646–48.
33. Id. at 646–47 (citation omitted). The Court also analogized its decision to
aiding and abetting liability, though did not base its decision on this theory as Daniel
had not been charged as an aider or abettor. Id.
34. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 946. At common law, the agreement
itself was all that was required for a conspiracy conviction. The overt act requirement
was introduced into the federal statute without explanation, possibly due to a
mistaken legislative interpretation of what was necessary to prove conspiracy at
common law. Id. at 945–47; see also United States v. Goodling, 25 U.S. 460, 469 (1827)
(“[T]he act of one conspirator . . . is considered the act of all, and is evidence against
all.”).
35. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
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same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not
attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them
36
Accordingly, the Court
responsible for the substantive offense.”
upheld Daniel’s convictions for Walter’s crimes.
In the next and final paragraph of the opinion, Douglas delivered
the passage that forms the basis for Pinkerton’s famous test, noting,
without elaboration, that
[a] different case would arise if the substantive offense committed
by one of the conspirators was not in fact done in furtherance of
the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful
project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which
could not be reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural
37
consequence of the unlawful agreement.

As discussed below, Pinkerton’s final paragraph later evolved into
the now widely followed two-part test. But, upon a close reading of
the decision it is far from clear that the Court intended to embrace
the broad “Pinkerton liability” that exists today. Specifically, today’s
two-part test seems to ignore the Court’s admonition regarding
vicarious liability for substantive offenses that do “not fall within the
38
scope of the unlawful project.”
This is significant because, in
Pinkerton, the substantive crimes and the goal of the scope of the
conspiracy were one in the same. The Pinkertons were convicted of
conspiracy to violate various provisions of the tax code and the
substantive crimes were instances where Walter “did unlawfully
remove, deposit and conceal . . . a large quantity of distilled spirits . . .
whereof a tax was then and there imposed by the laws of the United
States, with intent then and there to defraud the United States of
39
such tax.” In other words, the relationship between the scope of the
conspiracy and the substantive offenses in Pinkerton was as close as it
could be. As Justice Douglas explained: “The unlawful agreement
contemplated precisely what was done. It was formed for the purpose.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 647–48.
38. Id. This limit or “element” was not universally overlooked and was noted by
one court as late as 1978, but is now generally omitted from the Pinkerton charge used
in federal courts.
There are, of course, cases which fall within the exceptions in Pinkerton
where (1) the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators was
not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, (2) did not fall within the
scope of the unlawful project, or (3) was merely a part of the ramifications of
the plan which could not reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or
natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.
United States v. Molina, 581 F.2d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1978).
39. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500 (1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 640
(1946).
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The act done was in execution of the enterprise.” Accordingly, it is
far from clear that the Pinkerton majority believed it was authorizing
vicarious liability for crimes that were not also the actual objective of
41
the illegal agreement.
Whatever the majority’s intentions, however, Justice Rutledge
recognized the potentially sweeping nature of its holding. In a
42
dissent joined “in substance” by Justice Frankfurter, he sharply
43
criticized the majority’s opinion as “a dangerous precedent” that
appeared to pave the way for an “almost unlimited scope of vicarious
responsibility for others’ acts which follows once agreement is
44
shown.”
Rutledge, following the Third Circuit’s analysis, argued
that such a broad approach was inconsistent with the statutory
scheme adopted by Congress because it permitted Daniel to be
convicted for “substantive crimes committed only by Walter” without
any “evidence that he counseled, advised or had knowledge of those
45
particular acts or offenses.” In addition to statutory-based criticisms,
Rutledge argued that the majority’s approach to vicarious liability
may be unconstitutional, stating that, “[i]f it does not violate the
46
letter of constitutional right, it fractures the spirit.”
As a matter of statutory interpretation, Justice Rutledge’s reasoning
appears to be far more persuasive than the majority’s. Indeed, the
majority did not identify any statutory basis at all for holding
defendants liable for the substantive crimes of their co-conspirators
in the absence of proof of aiding and abetting. Nor did the Court
explain its reasons for rejecting Justice Rutledge’s and the Third
Circuit’s analysis of the federal aiding and abetting statute, which was
the only general provision of the criminal code defining vicarious

40. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added); see also id. (“The rule which
holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a
crime is founded on the same principle.”). Justice Douglas indicated another
possible limitation on conspiracy liability earlier in the opinion while discussing the
Pinkerton brothers’ separate merger argument. There, he sympathetically quoted a
report by the Conference of Senior Judges that concluded that “the theory which
permits us to call the aborted plan a greater offense than the completed crime
supposes a serious and substantially continued group scheme for cooperative law
breaking.” Id. at 644 n.4.
41. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949) (describing
Pinkerton as “narrow in scope” and applicable only “where the conspiracy was one to
commit offenses of the character described in the substantive counts”).
42. Id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J., substantially concurring in Justice Rutledge’s
dissent).
43. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
44. Id. at 650.
45. Id. at 651.
46. Id. at 650.
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47

liability. That statute, still in effect today, defines the instances in
which a person can be convicted as a principal for violating the
federal criminal code and does not include anything akin to Pinkerton
48
liability.
Instead, it limits liability as a principal of a crime to a
person who “aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its
49
Thus, the Pinkerton majority appears to have
commission . . . .”
created an entirely new basis for criminal liability out of statutory thin
air, arguably in violation of the prohibition against creation of federal
50
common law crimes.
To this day, the Pinkerton “elements” are
51
nowhere to be found in the federal criminal code, though they have
52
been incorporated into provisions of the (now discretionary)
53
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. By contrast, the federal conspiracy
statute specifies that the overt act requirement is satisfied where “one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the

47. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 994 (noting that the majority did not
identify the statutory basis for its holding).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) (“Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is
punishable as a principal.”); id. § 2(b) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done
which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the
United States, is punishable as a principal.”).
49. Id. § 2(a).
50. The lack of a statutory basis for the Court’s reasoning has been largely
unexamined by commentators. The one exception is a recent insightful Comment
by Michael Manning, which argues that Pinkerton impermissibly created a federal
crime without any statutory basis. Michael Manning, Comment, A Common Law Crime
Analysis of Pinkerton v. United States: Sixty Years of Impermissible Judicially-Created
Criminal Liability, 67 MONT. L. REV. 89 (2006); cf. United States v. Long, 301 F.3d
1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Pinkerton doctrine is a judicially-created rule that
makes a conspirator criminally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a coconspirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added).
51. Interestingly, at least one version of the Federal Criminal Code that was
proposed in the 1970s and 1980s sought to add Pinkerton elements to the federal
code. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1146 (noting that early drafts of the Code
rejected Pinkerton but later drafts added the “reasonably foreseeable” and “in
furtherance of” Pinkerton elements). But, the Code was never passed. See John S.
Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal
Crimes, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 545, 551 n.31 (“The proposal for a new Federal Criminal
Code was introduced in the 93rd Congress, and the effort to enact such legislation
lasted for about a dozen years.”).
52. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260 (2005).
53. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2006) (noting that
a defendant “is accountable for the conduct . . . of others that was both: (i) in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (ii) reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity”); see also United States v.
Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 575 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the sentencing guidelines’
relevant conduct standard). But see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 510
(1990) (noting that the sentencing rule may be somewhat more constrained than
Pinkerton liability).
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54

conspiracy,” further undercutting the soundness of the majority’s
reasoning that substantive vicarious liability was warranted as an
55
extension of the overt act rule.
In the years following Pinkerton, the decision was “almost universally
56
condemned by the academic community.”
And, although no
statistics exist, Pinkerton liability appears to have been “rarely utilized
57
until the 1970’s.” Indeed, in 1962 the drafters of the Modal Penal
58
Code rejected Pinkerton liability and by 1972, LaFave and Scott’s
influential Handbook on Criminal Law declared that the Pinkerton rule
59
had “never gained broad acceptance.” One factor that may have
54. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
55. For a policy-based argument against the Court’s analogy between an overt act
and substantive crime, see Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998. The most
plausible statutory justification for the Pinkerton majority’s holding is that it impliedly
determined “that ‘aiding and abetting’ and ‘conspiring’ are, and are intended by
Congress to be, the same thing, differing only in the form of the descriptive words.”
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 651 n.4 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see
also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 451 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“In Pinkerton v. United States, [the Court] sustained a conviction of a substantive
crime where there was no proof of participation in or knowledge of it, upon the
novel and dubious theory that conspiracy is equivalent in law to aiding and
abetting.”); cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 888 F.2d 1406, 1426 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“At their core, the Pinkerton
and the aider-and-abettor doctrines embody the same principle: a defendant who
willingly enters into a confederacy of crime can legitimately be held accountable for
all reasonably foreseeable offenses committed by his confederates.”); Jon May,
Pinkerton v. United States Revisited: A Defense of Accomplice Liability, 8 NOVA L.J. 21, 40
(1983) (“Membership in a conspiracy, however, is evidence of [a defendant’s] status
as an accessory before the fact and, to the extent that he is an accessory before the
fact, he is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his actions.”).
This account may be plausible under the facts of Pinkerton itself, given that the
substantive offenses and aims of the conspiracy were the same. The problem, of
course, is that “Pinkerton liability” is significantly broader than aiding and abetting
liability under the “natural and probable consequences” rule. See United States v.
Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that a conspirator’s liability for
crimes committed by other co-conspirators is broader than an aider and abettor’s
liability for the principal’s crimes); Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 995–96
(discussing breadth of Pinkerton liability in relation to accomplice liability). See
generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 689 (1930) (discussing vicarious criminal liability prior to Pinkerton). Indeed, if
it were otherwise, there would be no need for Pinkerton liability, as all Pinkerton
offenses would be aiding and abetting offenses. Thus, whatever the merits of
Pinkerton liability may be as a matter of policy, the decision does not appear to be
justifiable as a matter of statutory interpretation. See generally Manning, supra note 50
(arguing that there is no statutory basis for Pinkerton liability).
56. May, supra note 55, at 21–24 (discussing criticisms of Pinkerton).
57. Id. at 23.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. 6(a) (1962); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 358–59 (2d ed. 2003) (“Such [Pinkerton] liability might be
justified for those at the top directing and controlling the entire operation, but it is
clearly inappropriate to visit the same results upon the lesser participants in the
conspiracy.”).
59. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 515
(1st ed. 1972).
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contributed to Pinkerton’s disuse was the nature of federal sentencing
practices at the time, which led one commentator to conclude that
potential liability for additional substantive offenses under Pinkerton
was “not of great significance” because “only a very unimaginative
judge would actually fix the length of the prison term on so abstract a
60
basis.” It is worth noting, incidentally, that these dynamics likely
help explain the lack of scholarship focused on Pinkerton, and the
minimal treatment the case received in articles on conspiracy
generally, during that time.
In the early 1970s, however, things began to change as prosecutors
started to employ Pinkerton “with increasing frequency, particularly in
61
the context of narcotics prosecutions.” By the end of the decade,
the case, which seemed to have one foot in the grave during the
1960s, had become “extremely popular among state and federal
62
prosecutors.” In the process, two of the three factors identified offhandedly at the end of Justice Douglas’ opinion were quickly
transforming into a rule of black letter law that permitted vicarious
liability of a kind seemingly much broader than that envisioned by
the Pinkerton majority. By the early 1990s, the two-part test for
“Pinkerton liability” had gained nearly universal acceptance among the
courts. As Professor Paul Marcus explained: “In virtually every
jurisdiction in the United States, a conspirator can be held
responsible for crimes committed by her co-conspirators as long as
such crimes were in furtherance of the agreement and were
63
reasonably foreseeable.”
II. PINKERTON AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The emergence of cases treating Pinkerton’s two-prong test as a
constitutionally based minimum requirement for imposing vicarious
liability coincided with the rise of its use by prosecutors, possibly as a
way of preventing the increasingly broad interpretations of vicarious
64
liability under Pinkerton from tumbling out of control. Indeed, the
60. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165.
61. May, supra note 55, at 21.
62. Id. at 23.
63. Marcus, supra note 11, at 6. But see DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 527–29 (noting
that although the case is widely followed “one should be cautious in measuring the
strength of the Pinkerton rule” as some states have adopted it in a more limited form).
64.
While this result may at first seem harsh, liability is not unlimited. The Court
in Pinkerton was careful to point out that a conspirator is accountable only for
the acts of others in furtherance of the conspiracy, i.e., those acts which were
within the scope of or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
unlawful agreement.
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first federal decision to use the phrase “Pinkerton charge” also held
that its “elements” placed limits on vicarious liability in a conspiracy.
In 1964, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered postconviction motions for judgments of acquittal and new trials
stemming from a wide-ranging conspiracy in which eleven individuals
65
were found guilty of conspiracy. Four of these defendants were also
66
convicted of substantive offenses under a vicarious liability theory.
At trial, the court failed to instruct the jury on any of the Pinkerton
limits, charging them that, if they found the defendants guilty of the
conspiracy charge, they could also convict them of any “substantive
67
crime committed by other alleged co-conspirators.”
The
government argued that the failure to include the Pinkerton elements
in the jury charge was of no matter and that the convictions should
be upheld because the substantive crimes were necessarily committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court disagreed and reversed
the convictions, finding that the defendants could not be held
vicariously liable for substantive crimes of their co-conspirators that
68
they had not reasonably foreseen.
According to the court, the
limitations discussed briefly at the end of Pinkerton were “elements in
the absence of which guilt for the substantive crime could not attach
69
to all conspirators.” Although the decision did not describe the
Pinkerton limits as constitutionally based, its reasoning laid the
foundation for such a determination and begged the question: if the
“elements” in Pinkerton’s final paragraph are not based in statute, why
are they required for vicarious liability in a conspiracy?
The first instances of federal courts explicitly referencing “due
process” limitations in discussing vicarious liability under Pinkerton
came in the mid-1970s, around the same time prosecutors were
beginning to regularly bring Pinkerton charges against defendants.
The phenomenon developed largely in the Fifth Circuit, where a
handful of majority and dissenting opinions mentioned the possibility
of constitutional limits on, or inherent in, Pinkerton just as casually as
Justice Douglas had outlined the Pinkerton test itself. The first
example came in 1975, when a Fifth Circuit dissenter observed,

United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1104 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. United States v. Barrow, 229 F. Supp. 722, 724–25 (E.D. Pa. 1964), rev’d on
other grounds, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966).
66. Id. at 733–34.
67. Id. at 733.
68. Id. at 734 (“Only if the particular travel by the named traveler could be
reasonably foreseen by the non-traveling defendants could the jury convict on the
count alleging that travel.”).
69. Id.
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without elaboration, that the defendant “might raise due process
objections to the validity of his murder conviction on the Pinkerton
70
71
theory.” One year later, in United States v. Decker, a Fifth Circuit
majority picked up on the remark, noting that “[w]hile holding one
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of another may raise obvious
due process objections, it has received considerable support in this
72
Circuit in the conspiracy context.” In Decker, the defendant argued
that Pinkerton was unsound and should be overruled or, in the
alternative, that it should not apply to a drug distribution conspiracy
where a conspirator could become “liable for any remote sale of the
73
drug passing through the conspiracy.”
The court rejected these
arguments, though it explained that:
[w]hile this result may at first seem harsh, liability is not unlimited.
The Court in Pinkerton was careful to point out that a conspirator is
accountable only for the acts of others in furtherance of the
conspiracy, i.e., those acts which were within the scope of or were a
74
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the unlawful agreement.
75

Finally, in 1979, the court in United States v. Moren, again noted
the idea that vicarious liability “may have due process limitations” but
found that there was no cause for concern in that case because the
76
jury could have inferred actual drug possession by the defendants.
Thus, application of Pinkerton was “not so attenuated as to give us due
77
process concerns.”
In 1983, the Fifth Circuit expanded on its claim that Pinkerton’s
elements may impose constitutional minimums for vicarious liability.
78
In Ferguson v. Estelle, the court considered a habeas corpus petition
of two defendants who had been convicted of “arson by riot” under
79
the Texas Anti-Riot statute. The convictions were based on their
participation in a riot in which fifty union members “armed with 2 x
80
4’s, pipes, bottles, and rocks ‘invaded’” a job site. Twenty of the
rioters set fire to a trailer, but neither of the defendants was
81
identified as having directly participated in the arson. The Anti-Riot
70. Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
See generally Noferi, supra note 5, at 124–27 (discussing these early cases).
71. 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976).
72. Id. at 1103 (citing Park, 506 F.2d at 864 (Thornberry, J., dissenting)).
73. Id. at 1104.
74. Id.
75. 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1979).
76. Id. at 493.
77. Id.
78. 718 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 731.
80. Id. at 732.
81. Id.
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statute provided that a defendant who joined a riot could be held
vicariously liable for arson “by other participants in the riot, either in
furtherance of the purpose of the assembly or which should have
82
been anticipated as a result of the assembly.”
Though the
defendants did not dispute that both Pinkerton elements had been
proven in their case, they claimed their convictions should be
overturned because both elements were absent from the statute.
Specifically, they argued that the Anti-Riot statute was facially
unconstitutional “because it imposes criminal responsibility for the
acts of another in the absence of a relationship between the
defendant and the criminal conduct sufficiently substantial to satisfy
83
the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.”
The court began its analysis by discussing the 1961 Supreme Court
84
case Scales v. United States, which examined whether the Constitution
constrained imposition of criminal liability for participating in a
85
group that was engaged in both legal and illegal activity. In that
setting, the Scales Court held that the concept of “personal guilt”
under the Due Process Clause required that a defendant intend to
assist in the illegal aims of a group before criminal liability may be
imposed based on associating with a group that was engaged in illegal
86
activity. After its discussion of Scales, the Fifth Circuit turned to
vicarious liability under the Texas statute and found that, despite the
potential for concern in some cases, the defendants’ convictions were
constitutional because both of the Pinkerton elements had in fact been
87
shown. The court concluded, however, that, “[i]f, on the facts of a
particular case, it should appear that either [Pinkerton element] is
absent, an important question would arise. But the petitioners have
not suggested that theirs is such a case, and they are without standing
88
to raise the potential problems of others.”
In the middle of the 1980’s, the idea that Pinkerton’s test for
vicarious liability was constitutionally required began to gain broader
acceptance and spread outside of the Fifth Circuit. In the 1985 case
89
United States v. Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit provided the most
detailed discussion to that date of the constitutional limits on

82. Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. 367 U.S. 203 (1961). This case is discussed in more detail below. See infra
Part III (exploring the basis for constitutional limits on Pinkerton liability).
85. Estelle, 718 F.2d at 735–36 (discussing Scales).
86. 367 U.S. at 225.
87. Estelle, 718 F.2d at 736.
88. Id. (citing Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48).
89. 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985).
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vicarious liability in a conspiracy and implied that the Pinkerton limits
themselves may not be sufficient to meet due process concerns in all
instances. In Alvarez, a cocaine deal initiated by two undercover
federal agents turned into a shoot-out when one of the sellers heard
backup agents approaching the motel room where the transaction
90
was taking place. During the mêlée, one of the sellers shot and
91
killed one of the undercover officers. Three co-conspirators were
92
convicted of murder under a Pinkerton theory. One had served as an
armed lookout during the incident, another introduced the agents to
the “leader” of the conspiracy and was present during the shooting,
and the third acted as a Spanish to English translator during the
93
incident.
The defendants argued that their convictions were
unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently individually
94
culpable for the killing.
They claimed that the murder was too
distinct from the purposes of the drug transaction and that their
individual roles in the conspiracy were too minor to countenance
95
criminal liability. The government argued that those considerations
should be left to the prosecutor and that “prosecutorial discretion
would protect truly ‘minor participants’” in a conspiracy from
96
unwarranted criminal liability. The court rejected this view, and
strongly indicated that it believed due process might require
97
constraints on vicarious liability beyond the Pinkerton limitations.
Specifically, it found no authority for the government’s contention
“that all conspirators, regardless of individual culpability, may be held
responsible under Pinkerton for” substantive crimes that were
98
“reasonably foreseeable but originally unintended.”
The court
implied that vicarious liability for such crimes could only be imposed
if the defendant was not a minor participant in the conspiracy and
knew there was a strong likelihood that the foreseeable, but originally

90. Id. at 830–39.
91. Id. at 838–39.
92. Id. at 839.
93. Id. at 851.
94. Id. at 849–51.
95. Id. at 849.
96. Id. at 850 n.25.
97. See id. (“In our view, the liability of such ‘minor’ participants must rest on a
more substantial foundation than the mere whim of the prosecutor.”); see also id. at
850 (“Furthermore, we are mindful of the potential due process limitations on the
Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships between the
conspirator and the substantive crime.”).
98. Id.
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99

unintended, crime would be committed.
The court concluded,
however, that the “individual culpability” of the defendants in that
case was “sufficient,” because “the relationship between the
[defendants] and the murder was not so attenuated as to run afoul of
100
the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine.”
In addition to being the first case to imply that the Constitution
might preclude a conviction even where the Pinkerton test had
apparently been satisfied, Alvarez is noteworthy as an indication of
how far vicarious liability for the acts of co-conspirators had stretched
beyond the category of offenses that was at issue in Pinkerton. The
Alvarez court addressed this fact directly in its analysis by identifying
three different categories of substantive offenses that might be
punishable under the Pinkerton test. “The first and most common” is
where the substantive crime “is also one of the primary goals of the
101
alleged conspiracy,” as was the case in Pinkerton.
The second is
where the substantive crime directly facilitates one of the conspiracy’s
primary goals: for example, illegal gun possession during a bank
102
robbery.
Though the second category is beyond the conduct at
issue in Pinkerton, the Alvarez court characterized it as within the
103
heartland of “Pinkerton liability,” which was no doubt true by 1985.
The final category—and the one at issue in Alvarez—involves
substantive crimes that are committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy and are reasonably foreseeable, but were “not within the
104
originally intended scope of the conspiracy.”
The court
characterized liability for the third category of crimes as not typical
105
but also “not wholly unprecedented.”
The court’s concern about
the expansiveness of the third category seemed, in large part, to drive
its concern that due process might constrain Pinkerton’s test.
Following Alvarez, a number of other courts echoed the idea that
Pinkerton’s limits were constitutionally based. By 1991, the Fourth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits had all indicated their support for the
proposition that due process required, at a minimum, the Pinkerton
99. Id. at 850–51 (holding that the conviction did not run afoul of “potential due
process concerns” because “all three appellants had actual knowledge of at least
some of the circumstances and events leading up to the murder . . . were aware that
deadly force might be used,” and “were more than ‘minor’ participants in the drug
conspiracy”).
100. Id. at 851.
101. Id. at 850 n.24.
102. Id.
103. Id. (“In either of these two categories, Pinkerton liability can be imposed on all
conspirators because the substantive crime is squarely within the intended scope of
the conspiracy.”).
104. Id. at 850.
105. Id. at 850 n.25.
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106

limits on vicarious liability.
The first reversal of a Pinkerton
conviction on due process grounds came in 1993, in the Ninth
107
In Castaneda, Leticia
Circuit case United States v. Castaneda.
Castaneda’s husband was involved in a large-scale heroin and cocaine
business. Her role in the business appeared to be limited primarily to
delivering phone messages related to drug transactions between her
husband and other conspirators on a handful of occasions. On one
occasion, for example, Leticia was engaged in a social phone
conversation with one of the co-conspirators when her husband asked
her to relay information about his efforts to sell drugs, which she
108
did.
The strongest evidence against her was that, in one phone
conversation, she “active[ly] participat[ed]” in the conspiracy by
volunteering “that a street-level dealer had been arrested and that a
109
deal involving [another individual] had fallen through . . . .” Based
on this evidence, Castaneda was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
heroin and cocaine and, vicariously of seven counts of possession of a
110
firearm in relation to a drug offense. Six of the firearm convictions
stemmed from another conspirator’s possession of drugs and the
111
seventh was based on her own conspiracy conviction.
Castaneda challenged her convictions on a number of grounds but
not on the basis of substantive due process. The court, however,
raised the issue sua sponte as an error that was “obvious” and “seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public relations of the judicial
112
It framed its due process analysis in terms of
proceeding.”
113
Pinkerton’s reasonable foreseeability requirement and conducted its
foreseeability inquiry from the perspective of Castaneda’s role in the
106. See United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) (“The
foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern underlying a
possible due process violation.”); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding that convictions were not “so attenuated as to run afoul of
possible due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine”); United States v.
Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989) (“We recognize the potential due
process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated
relationships between the conspirator and the substantive crime.”). In addition, a
number of other state courts held that due process constrains vicarious liability in a
conspiracy. See Noferi, supra note 5, at 134–37 (discussing state court decisions).
Some state courts have also held that due process limits vicarious criminal liability
outside of the conspiracy setting. See Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and
Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 536–41 (1998) (reviewing cases).
107. 9 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. Id. at 767.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 764.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 766.
113. See id. (“The question is, was it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a
firearm would be used in relation to the predicate [possession] offense[s]?”).
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conspiracy and knowledge of the drug organization, as opposed to
114
“[G]iven Leticia’s lack of
the overall scope of the conspiracy.
participation in the conspiracy and her lack of involvement with the
predicate offenses,” the court determined that, it could not
“conclude, without violating the fundamental precepts of due
process, that Leticia could have foreseen the other conspirators’ use
115
of firearms in relation to the predicate offenses.”
The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Castaneda sheds light on the key
role that scope plays in a Pinkerton analysis, and in the application of
Pinkerton’s limitations as a rule of constitutional law. As discussed in
more depth below, the extent of liability under Pinkerton depends in
large part on whether the test is applied based on the scope of each
individual’s agreement (or participation) or on the scope of the
overall conspiracy. Though the court did not address the question of
how to define the scope of a conspiracy directly, its implicit narrow
approach to that issue was a determinative factor in the result it
116
reached. Conspicuously absent from the court’s decision, however,
was a detailed explanation of why Pinkerton’s limits are
constitutionally required. The court’s discussion on this point was
limited to its observation that “[s]everal circuits, including this one”
recognize that due process constrains the overly broad application of
vicarious liability under Pinkerton and its conclusion that Pinkerton’s
reasonably foreseeable prong was the main concept underlying a due
117
process analysis.
III. PINKERTON AND PERSONAL GUILT
118

119

120

Since Castaneda, the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
joined the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh in characterizing
114. Id. at 767.
115. Id. at 768.
116. See id. at 767 (explaining that “[t]he evidence does not show that she knew
much about Uriel’s or Barron’s organizations, that she knew the low-level
distributors involved, [nor] that she had any knowledge of Angulo-Lopez’s
organization”).
117. Id. at 766.
118. See United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 196 (1st Cir. 2000) (“We
agree with appellant that ‘due process constrains the application of Pinkerton where
the relationship between the defendant and the substantive offense is slight.’”
(quoting Castaneda, 9 F.3d at 766)).
119. United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 865 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing conviction
on the grounds that it was “an unwarranted, and possibly unconstitutional,
expansion of the Pinkerton doctrine” (citing Castaneda, 9 F.3d at 766)).
120. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that
extending Pinkerton liability to cover crimes removed from the original object of the
conspiracy “appears incompatible with the due process limitations inherent in
Pinkerton”).
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Pinkerton’s test as a due process-based limit on vicarious liability for
the acts of co-conspirators. The remaining circuits—the Second,
Third, Eighth and D.C. Circuits—have never reached the issue.
Despite this near consensus, however, no court has provided more
than a cursory explanation of the basis for treating Pinkerton’s limits
as constitutionally mandated or, more fundamentally, why the
Constitution limits vicarious criminal liability at all. Only the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits articulated a possible rationale for their
conclusion, by referencing concepts of “personal guilt” and
121
“individual culpability” respectively.
Neither court, however,
explained these ideas in any detail nor analyzed why they might
warrant adopting Pinkerton’s test as a due process limit on vicarious
criminal liability as opposed to other approaches.
The lack of analysis on this point is particularly surprising given
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized “personal guilt” as
a substantive due process limit on civil and criminal liability for the
122
acts of others.
Although the Supreme Court’s personal guilt
jurisprudence developed largely in the context of challenges to the
123
anti-Communist measures of the McCarthy era, the Court also
mentioned the importance of personal guilt in some of its conspiracy
124
decisions from the same time period. At its core, the rule prohibits
“guilt by association” in the absence of a substantial relationship
between the defendant and the third party’s criminal activity. An
individual cannot be held vicariously liable merely because she
associates with a group or third party that commits a crime. There
125
must be a sufficient, “non-tenuous,” link between her association
and the third party’s criminal actions. Though a few courts have offhandedly mentioned the “personal guilt” concept in characterizing
121. See supra Part II (discussing United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir.
1976), United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1979), Ferguson v. Estelle, 718
F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1985)).
122. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 163 (1945) (“The doctrine of personal
guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of our jurisprudence. It partakes of
the very essence of the concept of freedom and due process of law.”); Cole, supra
note 20, at 218 (“In the wake of Scales, the Court consistently applied the ‘specific
intent’ standard to a range of anti-Communist statutes, including many that imposed
only a civil disability.”).
123. See Cole, supra note 20, at 215–16 (describing the history of the personal guilt
requirement).
124. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772 (1946) (“Guilt with us
remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies. It is not a matter of
mass application.”).
125. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (stating personal guilt
requires an “analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability”).
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126

Pinkerton’s limits as constitutionally mandated, a close examination
of the doctrine adds significant weight to that position and, perhaps
more importantly for our purposes, helps build a foundation for
understanding on what it might mean for other areas of vicarious
criminal liability.
The most detailed explanation of the personal guilt requirement
came in Scales, in 1961, when the Supreme Court considered a
provision of the Smith Act that made it a crime to be a member of
the Communist Party. In Scales, Julius Irving Scales challenged a
conviction under the Smith Act, which made it a felony to be a
“knowing” member “in any organization which advocates the
overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or
127
violence.”
In an effort to square the statute with constitutional
protections, the trial court interpreted it very narrowly to require a
showing that the defendant was an “active” member in the
organization and that he acted with the specific intent of achieving
128
the group’s unlawful aims. With this limiting construction in place,
the trial court convicted Scales based on his membership in the
Communist Party. Before the Supreme Court, he argued that the law
ran afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s substantive due process
protection by impermissibly imputing guilt without “some concrete
129
involvement in criminal conduct.”
126. Recently, Mark Noferi insightfully observed the potential relationship
between Scales’ personal guilt requirement and due process limits on vicarious
liability under Pinkerton. Noferi, supra note 5, at 116–19 (providing an overview of
Scales). His analysis, however, did not explore what this might mean for the Pinkerton
test itself but instead focused on proposing a constitutional limit on vicarious liability
beyond the Pinkerton limits. See id. at 147–52 (proposing a new due process limit on
Pinkerton liability and discussing the concept of personal guilt). No other
commentator appears to have discussed Scales in relation to Pinkerton.
127. Scales, 367 U.S. at 205.
128. Id. at 220.
129. Id. Scales also challenged his conviction on First Amendment grounds,
arguing that the Smith Act violated his right of freedom of association. Id. at 228.
The Court rejected Scales’ First Amendment claim on similar but narrower grounds
than his due process argument. Id. at 230. Specifically, it held that the conviction
did not violate Scales’ associational rights because he specifically intended to
accomplish the illegal ends of the organization. Id. at 229. The Court began its brief
First Amendment analysis with a comparison to criminal conspiracy laws. Id. In a
typical conspiracy, “all knowing association with the conspiracy is a proper subject for
criminal proscription as far as First Amendment liberties are concerned” because the
conspiracy is “defined by its unlawful purpose.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the
Smith Act presented a different situation by reaching groups that had both legal and
illegal aims, the Court found that the added “specific intent” requirement was
sufficient to ensure that a “member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the
advancement of legitimate aims and policies [would] not fall within the ban of the
statute . . . .” Id. According to the Court, this limiting construction prevented the
danger that the statute would impair legitimate expression and associations. See id.
(noting the membership clause should only be construed as far as necessary to deal
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Though the Court upheld Scales’ conviction based on the trial
court’s constrained interpretation of the Smith Act, it agreed that the
Due Process Clause requires a minimum level of “personal guilt” in
order to impose criminal liability based on the actions of a third
130
party.
This requirement is substantive, not procedural, and
prohibits punishing an individual for another’s acts unless she has a
sufficient connection to those acts. The Scales Court explained that
the key issue in determining whether the personal guilt requirement
has been met is the relationship between the defendant’s conduct
and the third party’s concededly illegal activity:
when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can
only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or
conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of
violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
131
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Accordingly, the Court noted, criminal liability cannot be based on
passive membership in an organization engaged in illegal activity
because membership alone does not ensure a sufficiently substantial
132
relationship between the defendant and the criminal acts.
Though the Court did not spell out a precise test for determining
whether the “substantial relationship” requirement has been met in a
given case, it highlighted two factors in upholding Scales’ conviction:
knowledge of and intent to further the criminal activity and a
minimum level of active involvement in working to achieve the
133
organization’s illegal ends.
These factors indicate that a
with groups with illegal aims); see also Cole, supra note 20, at 218 (“Under the First
Amendment [as interpreted in Scales], then, the ‘specific intent’ standard is
necessary to tailor the government’s regulation to the harms it may legitimately
regulate and to minimize the infringement of lawful association.”). Thus, under
Scales, the right of association limits criminal penalties only insofar as they may
infringe on legitimate associations. If the group is an entirely criminal enterprise,
however, then its members can be punished simply for knowingly associating with it,
without undercutting the First Amendment. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229. By contrast, the
Due Process Clause personal guilt concept requires a substantial relationship
between the individual and the punishable activity or acts; mere membership is not
enough. See id. at 225 (“Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in
illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to
[satisfy the requirement of personal guilt.]”). Professor David Cole offers a
persuasive argument against this view of associational rights, on the theory that
virtually all associations have both legal and illegal aims. See Cole, supra note 20, at
222 (“[I]t is undoubtedly the rare gang that engages exclusively in illegal behavior.
Gangs also provide social activities and networks of support to their members.”).
130. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224–25.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 225.
133. See, e.g., id. at 227 n.18 (noting that personal guilt problems in ascribing
criminal acts to an organization were “certainly cured, so far as any particular
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relationship between a defendant and another’s criminal activity
must be based on a minimally culpable mental state and a level of
active assistance or influence in order for it to be sufficiently
substantial for personal guilt.
As an initial matter, the Scales Court compared the Smith Act with
conspiracy and complicity law and found that those doctrines dispel
“[a]ny thought that due process puts beyond the reach of the
criminal law all individual associational relationships, unless
134
accompanied by the commission of specific acts of criminality . . . .”
Punishment for involvement in an associational relationship does not
impermissibly constitute guilt by association, the Court explained, so
long as the defendant “knowingly works in the ranks of that
organization, intending to contribute to the success of those
135
specifically illegal activities . . . .” But, knowledge or intent to assist
in another’s illegal acts is not by itself sufficient to permit
punishment. There must be something more concrete. Again,
drawing from the law of conspiracy, the Court pointed to its
requirement that a conspirator commit to act in furtherance of the
136
illegal aims of the enterprise.
Requiring a commitment to act to
help bring about the prescribed conduct prevents punishment for
knowledge of illegal activity or the “mere[] . . . expression of
sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any
significant action in its support or any commitment to undertake
137
such action.” In other words, in order to establish personal guilt for
another’s illegal acts, a defendant must influence or attempt to
influence the illegal conduct, not just know about or sympathize with
it. The Scales Court concluded that the trial court’s interpretation of
the Smith Act, which limited application to active members, satisfied
138
this requirement.

defendant is concerned, by the requirement of proof that he knew that the
organization engages in criminal advocacy, and that it was his purpose to further that
criminal advocacy”); id. at 226–27 (“[W]e can perceive no reason why one who
actively and knowingly works in the ranks of that organization, intending to
contribute to the success of those specifically illegal activities, should be any more
immune from prosecution than he to whom the organization has assigned the task of
carrying out the substantive criminal act.”).
134. Id. at 225.
135. Id. at 227.
136. Id. at 227–28 (“It may indeed be argued that such [moral] assent and
encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal
enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of a conspirator to
act in furtherance of that enterprise.”).
137. Id. at 228.
138. See id. (noting that constitutional concerns “are duly met when the statute is
found to reach only ‘active’ members having also a guilty knowledge and intent”).
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At first blush, one might wonder whether Scales mandates
significantly stricter standards than Pinkerton’s for vicarious criminal
liability: namely, intent to contribute to and actively assist each
substantive offense. After all, as with liability under the Smith Act,
vicarious criminal liability in any setting is “justified by reference to
the relationship of . . . [a defendant’s] status or conduct to other
139
concededly criminal activity”
and accordingly might implicate
personal guilt in the same way as in Scales. Of course, such strict
requirements would be dramatically inconsistent not just with
Pinkerton but also with traditional accomplice liability rules, which
permitted liability for substantive crimes that a defendant knew his
accomplice was likely to commit, but which he did not intend to
140
assist.
A key distinction between the Smith Act and true vicarious
liability, however, indicates that personal guilt is unlikely to require
nearly so much in most settings.
The Smith Act, like the crime of conspiracy, punished the act of
associating with others for a criminal purpose. It did not hold
141
defendants liable for another’s “specific acts of criminality,” but for
142
participating in an illegal enterprise.
This, of course, is not true
vicarious liability. In Scales, the conviction was “justified by
143
reference” to others’ criminal activity only in the sense that that
activity is what made Scales’ own act of knowing and intentional
participation in the organization a crime. If the organization had not
144
been engaged in “concededly illegal activity,” then Scales’ active
and knowing membership would have been entirely innocent. Thus,
to ensure convictions meet with personal guilt limits in a Smith Act or
substantive conspiracy setting, there must be a strict requirement.
Otherwise, people could be punished simply for being friends or
associates with someone who turns out to have been committing
crimes.
True vicarious criminal liability as it currently exists presents a
related, but distinct, personal guilt problem. Rules like the Pinkerton
doctrine, the natural and probable consequences rule of accomplice
liability, and the felony murder doctrine, explicitly base criminal
139. Id. at 224–25.
140. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 995–96 (describing traditional rules
of complicity and vicarious liability).
141. Scales, 367 U.S. at 225.
142. See id. at 227 n.18 (“Understood in this way, there is no great difference
between a charge of being a member in a group which engages in criminal conduct
and being a member of a large conspiracy, many of whose participants are unknown
or not before the court.”).
143. Id. at 224.
144. Id. at 225.
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liability on another’s actions. But, they do so only after the
defendant has already intentionally become involved in a criminal
enterprise. As a result, under current criminal vicarious liability rules
there is already at least some punishable relationship between the
defendant and the third party that commits the underlying
145
Needless to say, this fact does not eliminate
substantive offense.
guilt by association concerns in these settings—for example,
punishing someone involved in a criminal enterprise for another
member’s crimes that were entirely unrelated to the enterprise would
surely be impermissible—but it helps explain why stringent
requirements like those imposed in Scales may not be required to
establish personal guilt in the context of standard vicarious criminal
liability. The central question is whether there is a substantial
relationship between the defendant’s criminal conduct or agreement
and the particular substantive offense.
Before more closely examining Pinkerton’s limits in light of the
personal guilt requirement, it is worth noting that the Scales Court
did briefly, albeit in passing, observe the problem vicarious liability in
the conspiracy setting may pose for personal guilt. Specifically, in a
footnote on the law of complicity and conspiracy, the Court noted
that “genuine [personal guilt] problems arise as to whether a
conspirator is, by reason of his conspiracy to be considered an
146
accomplice and therefore guilty also of the substantive offense.”
Though the Court did not elaborate on this somewhat cryptic
147
remark, it supported the assertion by citing two authorities that had
148
a
been highly critical of the expansive application of Pinkerton:
draft of the Model Penal Code, which rejected Pinkerton liability
149
entirely, and a section of a Harvard Law Review piece that argued,
among other things, that “[n]o court which has taken the Pinkerton
approach has offered an adequate rationale for convicting a
150
conspirator for the crimes of his associates.”
Though this passage
does not offer much help for determining how the personal guilt

145. Needless to say, a different case would arise if vicarious criminal liability were
imposed without an existing criminal relationship.
146. Id. at 227 n.17.
147. Id. (“But we are solely concerned here with pointing up the accepted limits of
imputation of guilt, not with exploring the problems created by the various
provisions by which such imputation is effected.”).
148. See id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE 20–33 (Tentative Draft No. 1 1953));
Criminal conspiracy, supra note 10, at 993–1000.
149. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(reaffirming that criminal liability is based on conduct, but that liability can still be
applied to situations where the conduct is that of another).
150. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 998.
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requirement might apply to Pinkerton, it does indicate that the Scales
Court believed that some due process constraints would apply to
vicarious liability in the conspiracy setting.
As discussed above, the due process personal guilt requirement is
satisfied only if there is a “sufficiently substantial” relationship
between the defendant’s conduct and the “other concededly criminal
151
activity.” In a Pinkerton case, the relevant inquiry is the relationship
between the defendant’s agreement or participation in the
conspiracy and the substantive crimes.
The two factors that
established this relationship in Scales—(1) specific intent and
152
(2) active assistance —closely track the two Pinkerton factors, which
require a knowing agreement in combination with negligence for
crimes that further the agreement and a minimum “causal” or
influential link between the defendant’s participation in the
153
conspiracy and each substantive crime.
Most of the courts that have interpreted Pinkerton’s test as a
constitutional minimum have focused on the requirement that the
substantive crime have been “reasonably foreseeable” to the
154
defendant.
This element, in effect, sets a mens rea of negligence
151. Scales, 367 U.S. at 224–25.
152.
We think, however, [the personal guilt requirement is] duly met when the
statute is found to reach only “active” members having also a guilty
knowledge and intent, and which therefore prevents a conviction on what
otherwise might be regarded as merely an expression of sympathy with the
alleged criminal enterprise, unaccompanied by any significant action in its
support or any commitment to undertake such action.
Id. at 228.
153. As discussed above, the Scales Court’s requirements of knowledge, specific
intent, and “significant action . . . or [a] commitment to undertake such action” in
support of the concededly criminal conduct, are more stringent than the Pinkerton
requirements. Id. This difference appears to be adequately explained by the fact
that Pinkerton vicarious liability attaches only after an individual has already
committed a crime by knowingly entering the conspiracy, whereas Scales concerns
liability for entering into the forbidden association in the first instance. Of course,
one might argue that personal guilt or theories of punishment warrant stricter mens
rea and causation requirements in all cases. See Noferi, supra note 5, at 124–33, 147–
55 (arguing that the Constitution requires an “attenuation” limit on vicarious liability
under Pinkerton); cf. Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of
Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 120–40
(arguing for a stricter causation requirement in the imposition of accomplice
liability); Robinson, supra note 10, at 638 (“Under the complicity aspect of felony
murder, the Pinkerton doctrine, and the natural and probable consequences rule, a
defendant may be held liable for an offense even though he does not satisfy the
[mental state] culpability requirements of the offense.”). For purposes of analyzing
cases holding Pinkerton’s requirements to be rooted in due process, however, it is
sufficient to point out that the mental and causal components of the Pinkerton
requirements are similar in nature to the elements in Scales.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766–68 (9th Cir. 1993)
(discussing the due process limits of Pinkerton).
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for substantive crimes committed in furtherance of the agreement.
Many commentators and some courts have strongly criticized this fact
and argued that negligence “is not a usual criminal law concept and
surely not a concept that puts meaningful due process limits on
156
criminal liability.”
While the critique of negligence in the area of
vicarious liability is persuasive in many ways, limiting application to
crimes that were a foreseeable result of a knowing and unlawful
agreement arguably has a footing in the “ancient” principle that “an
actor is responsible for the unintended harms resulting from an
157
unlawful act.” In any event, whether or not the Due Process Clause
may possibly require more, it seems that Scales’ personal guilt
requirement, at a minimum, would require negligence with respect
158
to others’ crimes for vicarious liability.
If a defendant could not
reasonably have foreseen that one of her co-conspirators would
commit the substantive crime in furtherance of their jointly
undertaken agreement, then her relationship to that crime would be
159
160
at least as “tenuous” as the types of links rejected in Scales. Under
a strict liability standard, a defendant could be held liable for crimes
161
she did not in any way “aid and encourage[]” and, indeed, had no
reason to think would occur. If the concept of “personal guilt” and
the “substantial relationship” requirement mean anything in the
context of Pinkerton, presumably they mean that a defendant must

155. See United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003)
(“‘Foreseeability’ is the language of negligence law.”); Pauley, supra note 11, at 6
(“The ‘reasonably foreseeable’ component of the Pinkerton doctrine in effect imputes
criminal liability for what the Model Penal Code calls negligence.”). But see Wilkins
& Steer, supra note 53, at 512 (arguing that it is not settled whether the reasonably
foreseeable standard is an “objective of subjective” standard).
156. See Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 67–68 n.3; see also Paul Silvio Berra, Jr., CoConspirator Liability under 18 U.S.C. 924(c): Is It Possible to Escape, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 603,
630 (arguing that “the reasonable foreseeability standard is not an appropriate basis
for assessing co-conspirator guilt, as it punishes for mere negligence”); supra note 10
(discussing the major articles on conspiracy since 1959).
157. Binder, supra note 3, at 73.
158. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968) (noting that there is “a world of
difference between punishing people for the harm they unintentionally but
carelessly cause, and punishing them for the harm which no exercise or reasonable
care on their part could have avoided”).
159. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (“[T]he enquiry here must
direct itself to an analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability.”).
160. See id. at 228 (rejecting vicarious liability based on “merely an expression of
sympathy” with another’s crimes).
161. Id. at 227.
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have some minimally culpable mental state with respect to the “other
162
concededly criminal activity.”
Though courts holding that the Pinkerton test is rooted in due
process have generally focused on its “reasonably foreseeable” prong,
the “in furtherance of” requirement touches on an equally important
aspect of the relationship between a defendant’s conduct and the
third party’s crimes: actus reus and causation. In the area of
vicarious liability, causation is perhaps even more closely wedded to
163
personal guilt than mens rea because it “links the actor to the
164
[third party’s act and resulting] harm.”
Accordingly, in Scales, the
Court required active membership to prevent against liability based
165
on a “mere[] expression of sympathy” with another’s criminal acts.
Of course, the “in furtherance of” standard, like “active assistance,” is
a far cry from true but-for causation. A defendant can be convicted
under Pinkerton of a substantive crime that would have been
166
committed exactly as it was without her participation. Still, the “in

162. See id. at 225; see also United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir.
1991) (“The foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern
underlying a possible due process violation.”).
163. See Dressler, supra note 153, at 103 (“Causation, then, is the instrument we
employ to ensure that responsibility is personal.”). Another possible account of
vicarious criminal liability is as an exception to the rule that one does not have a
“duty to act” to prevent a crime or harm from occurring. One might argue that by
entering into a criminal agreement, an individual creates the risk that additional
crimes will be committed in furtherance of that agreement and, as a result, can justly
be punished for the “omission” of preventing those crimes. Cf. Jones v. Indiana, 43
N.E.2d 1017, 1018–19 (Ind. 1942) (defendant had a duty to rescue a woman who
jumped or fell into a creek after he raped her because he created the risk that led to
her death).
164. Dressler, supra note 153, at 103; see Sayre, supra note 55, at 702 (noting
causation as a key element of “the fundamental, intensely personal, basis of criminal
liability”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 588–89 (2d ed.
1991) (“Criminal acts done in furtherance of a conspiracy may be sufficiently
dependant upon the encouragement and material support of the group as a whole to
warrant treating each member as a causal agent to each act.”). There is a persuasive
argument that results cannot form the basis of moral blameworthiness and that
culpability should be based on intentional actions that risk a harmful result. See
Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
366 (“[T]he consequences of action cannot be fully guided and are thus not
appropriate predicates for desert. Full culpability and desert are established by
intentional action that risks a harmful result.”). This Article, however, explores the
concept of personal guilt as it relates to Pinkerton and a traditional understanding of
vicarious liability in criminal law. Accordingly, an examination of the argument
against the use of results in criminal law is beyond the scope of this Article.
165. Scales, 367 U.S. at 228.
166. See Dressler, supra note 153, at 102 (observing that in the area of accomplice
liability, an accomplice “is accountable for the actions of the perpetrator even if the
desired consequences would have occurred precisely when they did without her
conduct”); Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 446–48 (2007) (explaining that “vicarious accomplices” do not
causally contribute to the result of the underlying offense).
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furtherance of” requirement addresses the same underlying concern
as causation, despite the fact that it is less rigorous. It ensures that
167
the defendant influenced or attempted to influence the substantive
crime. Indeed, without the “in furtherance of” requirement, a
conspirator could be convicted of substantive crimes that had no
relationship (beyond mere coincidence) to his actions. For example,
returning to the hypothetical example from the beginning of this
Article, if I knew that my co-conspirator enjoyed smoking marijuana,
I could certainly have “reasonably foreseen” that he would purchase
some during the course of planning our bank robbery, but that
would not establish a relationship between our agreement and his
purchase. The “in furtherance of” requirement, like the “active
assistance” requirement in Scales, ensures there is a link between the
defendant’s conduct and the third party’s crime not just between the
defendant and the third person.
The above discussion helps to fill in some of the holes left by the
courts that have held that Pinkerton establishes a constitutional floor
for vicarious criminal liability. In Scales, the Supreme Court held that
in order to establish personal guilt for another’s actions, there must
be a substantial relationship between the defendant and the third
party’s conduct. This substantial relationship rule clarifies why the
Pinkerton test might provide a due process limit on vicarious criminal
liability. By requiring that a defendant at least have been able to
foresee that his co-conspirator would commit a particular crime to
further their illegal agreement, the Pinkerton doctrine ties the crime
to the defendant’s illegal conduct—the agreement. Without these
limits on liability, a person could be held liable for another’s
substantive crimes based exclusively on a “guilt by association” theory
because conspirators could be convicted of crimes committed by one
another that were entirely unrelated to the conspiracy, simply by
virtue of the fact that they were co-conspirators. In short, Scales
appears to provide a strong foundation for the consistent but often
hollow string of cases finding that due process requires the Pinkerton
167. For example, Neal Kumar Katyal defends Pinkerton liability because it
accounts for the influence a conspirator has in bringing about her partners’ crimes.
See Katyal, supra note 9, at 1372 (“[A] broad range of evidence suggests that
conspirators often do influence, in profound ways, each other’s behavior, not simply
through their direct commands but also by their mere presence.”). This relationship
of influence is non-existent for crimes that are independent of, and do not further,
the conspiratorial agreement. See Pauley, supra note 11, at 6 (quoting the President
of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers’ statement that Pinkerton
“permits the government to hold a defendant criminally liable for all reasonably
foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless of actual knowledge, intent, or
participation”).
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limits.
More importantly for our purposes, however, this
understanding of the personal guilt concept is helpful in exploring
some of the ways in which that line of cases might impact other areas
of criminal law if courts were to apply them seriously and consistently.
IV. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND PERSONAL GUILT IN OTHER AREAS OF
CRIMINAL LAW
Whether or not one agrees with the decisions that have found the
Pinkerton limits to be constitutionally required, if courts that have
adopted this position begin to apply it in other areas of criminal law,
it could have a potentially significant impact on a wide range of areas
of criminal law: from strict liability to the willful blindness doctrine.
The most likely areas of impact, however, are in the context of other
vicarious liability rules. This section analyzes three vicarious liability
doctrines: (1) the definition of the “scope” of an agreement in
conspiracy law, (2) the felony murder rule as applied to killings by cofelons, and (3) the “material support” provision of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act. Cases recognizing Pinkerton as a due
process minimum pose difficult challenges in each area and indicate
that important adjustments may be needed in order to be consistent
with the requirement of personal guilt.
A. Scope
Determining the “scope” of a conspiracy has historically been one
168
of the most confusing and frustrating tasks in conspiracy law.
Rarely is a criminal enterprise organized like a legitimate business,
with clearly delineated lines and participants. And, even in cases
where conspirators have readily defined roles, there is still no bright
line test for determining whether a given defendant—particularly
one with minimal involvement in the group—should be prosecuted
as part of a single far-reaching “conspiracy” or as part of a smaller
169
conspiratorial group.
The guidelines that courts have adopted to
resolve these problems pre-date the rise of Pinkerton and were shaped
168. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. at 422–23 (1985) (“Much of the most
perplexing litigation in conspiracy has been concerned less with the essential
elements of the offense than with the scope to be accorded to a combination . . . .”);
see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992) (describing the
“age-old problem of what constitutes a [single] conspiracy”).
169. See Scott v. United States, 255 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958) (“[I]t is not always
easy to determine the proper unit for purposes of prosecution. In some instances
each day’s action or inaction is made a separate offense; in others a longer course of
action constitutes a single offense . . . . Where to draw the line, in the absence of
clear statutory delineation, presents a problem to one’s judgment and sense of
fairness.”).
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170

primarily by evidentiary and practical concerns at a time when the
scope of a conspiracy was largely irrelevant to a defendant’s sentence
171
Cases were brought under the
or substantive criminal liability.
general federal conspiracy statute, which did not link the severity of
172
the offense to the scope or object of the conspiracy.
Thus, a
defendant’s punishment was generally the same whether she was
convicted as part of one large trial of a broadly defined conspiracy or
as part of a more narrowly defined conspiracy that focused on her
173
specific agreement. Indeed, before the rise of “Pinkerton liability,” a
broadly defined conspiracy was arguably favorable to defendants
because it ensured that parties to the original agreement were not
charged with separate conspiracy counts “every time a new party
174
enters or an old one withdraws.” Thus, when defendants objected
to broadly defined conspiracies, they did so on the basis that “mass
trials” of loosely connected defendants might lead to “unwarranted

170. See Marie E. Siesseger, Note, Conspiracy Theory: The Use of the Conspiracy
Doctrine in Times of National Crises, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1177, 1189 (2004) (“The
evidentiary implications of conspiracy have been critically important in shaping the
current doctrine.”).
171. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165–66 (“From the viewpoint of the
substantive criminal law, the duration and scope of a conspiratorial relationship are
not of great significance. . . . Issues of scope and duration are of practical
significance only as they affect the resolution of procedural questions.”). As late as
1973, nearly twenty years after Pinkerton, this remained the case as judges generally
did not set a defendant’s “prison term upon so abstract a basis.” Id.
172. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 541 (1947) (noting that “[t]he
charge was made pursuant to the general conspiracy statute, § 37 of the Criminal
Code”); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 752 (1946) (explaining
“[p]etitioners were convicted under the general conspiracy section of the Criminal
Code”).
173. Indeed, to this day, culpability for a conspiracy conviction itself is not linked
to the object or scope of the conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute. See
Katyal, supra note 9, at 1337 (noting that “conspiracy law employs a blunt
punishment, such as the five-year prison term in the general federal conspiracy
statute, instead of always calibrating punishment to the object of the illegal
agreement”). Of course, this is changing as a number of federal conspiracy statutes
now calibrate culpability to the scope of the conspiracy. See infra notes 209–214 and
accompanying text (discussing drug sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), which
provides that a defendant is “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy”).
174. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 928 (“[T]he courts seem to be using
the word conspiracy to refer not to a crime, which by definition must be an act, but
rather to a group,” and noting that, though defining a conspiracy with respect to a
group rather than each individual’s agreement is logically unsound, “[t]he effects
which follow from the use of the word in that sense are not always harmful”); see also
United States v. Braverman, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (reversing convictions on seven
counts of conspiracy because “[t]he one agreement cannot be taken to be several
agreements”).
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imputation of guilt from others’ conduct” and unfair application of
175
the relaxed hearsay and venue rules in conspiracy law.
It was in this setting that the Supreme Court held that a defendant
could be convicted of participating in a single conspiracy so long as
he knew “the essential nature of the plan and [his] connections with
it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the
176
participation of others.”
Under this practical evidentiary-based
model, courts generally focus on qualities and characteristics of the
group as a whole in determining a conspiracy’s scope, such as the
nature of the criminal activity, the number of defendants, and the
extent to which the alleged co-conspirators’ activity was
177
The question of whether a particular defendant
interdependent.
was a member of the “conspiracy” is addressed only after the
conspiratorial group has been thusly defined. On this point, courts
ask only whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became
part of the group, but do not require that the defendant knew of or
178
agreed to each of the group’s aims.
An individual is guilty of
joining a conspiracy so long as she “knew at least [its] essential
179
objectives” and “knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it” —“a
person does not need to know or participate in every detail of the
180
As a result,
conspiracy, or to know all the conspiracy’s members.”
the scope of each defendant’s agreement or participation can
become only minimally relevant to her ultimate liability if the scope
determination is used for more than procedural or practical
purposes.
The rise of “Pinkerton liability” has dramatically changed the effect
181
of loosely defining the scope of a conspiracy. Before Pinkerton, the
175. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776–77; see Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 559 (“The danger
rested . . . in the risk that the jury, in disregard of the court’s direction, would
transfer, consciously or unconsciously, the effect of the excluded admissions [from
two defendants] to the other three defendants.”).
176. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557; see id. at 558 (“By their separate agreements, if
such they were, they became parties to the larger common plan, joined together by
their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope, though not of its exact
limits, and by their common single goal.”).
177. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 483; see also United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d
663, 668 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting the issue of interdependence).
178. See United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[O]nce it
has been shown that a conspiracy exists, the evidence need only establish a slight
connection between the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction.”).
179. United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990).
180. United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1080 (7th Cir. 1990); see United States
v. Byerley, 999 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1993) (“As long as the conspiracy continues
and its goal is to achieve a common objective, it is sufficient that a party have reason
to know that others were involved in the conspiracy.”).
181. Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 929 (“When, however, additional
criminal liability will be imposed by holding a defendant to be a member of the
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scope definition primarily impacted issues like application of the coconspirator hearsay exception and satisfaction of the overt act
182
requirement. Accordingly, the central constraint on how broadly to
define a conspiracy was whether a broad definition, in combination
with the use of these doctrines, prejudiced the defendant by failing to
guard against “[t]he dangers of transference of guilt from one to
183
another across the line separating conspiracies.”
By contrast, in
combination with vicarious liability under Pinkerton, a broadly defined
conspiracy has the potential to significantly increase a defendant’s
substantive criminal liability. Nevertheless, most courts continue to
184
treat the issue of scope as an evidentiary issue and find that “a
defendant may be convicted of conspiracy with little or no knowledge
185
of the entire breadth of the criminal enterprise . . . .”
By broadly
defining a single conspiracy, one court went so far as to hold, for
example, that a defendant could be vicariously liable for substantive
crimes that were committed before he even joined the conspiracy, so
long as they were reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the
186
conspiracy as a whole. Even courts that employ a relatively measured
approach to defining the scope of a conspiracy continue to hold that
a defendant does not need to know the “full extent of the conspiracy”
‘same’ conspiracy, it seems that courts should be careful to use the word to refer to
the crime of conspiracy rather than the [conspiratorial] group.”).
182. See id. at 928–29 (discussing effect of focusing on the conspiratorial group
rather than each conspirator’s agreement).
183. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946); see id. at 752 (“The only
question is whether petitioners have suffered substantial prejudice from being
convicted of a single general conspiracy by evidence which the Government admits
proved not one conspiracy but some eight or more different ones of the same sort
executed through a common key figure, Simon Brown.”); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 82 (1933) (“The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a
variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the
substantial rights’ of the accused.”).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890, 900 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The
existence of separate conspiracies is a question of fact, not of law, to be determined
by the jury.”).
185. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 178 (2nd Cir. 1991)
(holding that defendant can be held liable for drug weight in a conspiracy based on
the prior acts of co-conspirators if he “knew or reasonably should have known” of the
acts when he joined the conspiracy). But see United States v. Carrascal-Olivera, 755
F.2d 1446, 1452 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The courts’ refusal to extend Pinkerton liability
for substantive criminal acts to co-conspirators who were not part of the conspiracy
when the crime was completed may stem from due process concerns about vicarious
guilt in attenuated circumstances.”); Robert R. Arreola et al., Federal Criminal
Conspiracy, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 617, 628–29 (1997) (“In establishing liability for the
conspiracy charge, the circuit courts generally find conspirator liability for acts
committed by co-conspirators both prior to, as well as during the defendant’s
participation. However, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for substantive
offenses committed by others involved in the conspiracy before joining it or after
ending participation in the conspiracy.”) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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and that “a general awareness” of the scope and object of the
187
conspiracy is sufficient “to be regarded as a co-conspirator.” Many
courts and commentators have pointed to the interplay between the
188
scope of a conspiracy and vicarious liability in criticizing Pinkerton.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code cited this concern as one of
189
While
their primary reasons for rejecting the Pinkerton doctrine.
the application of Pinkerton to a broadly defined conspiracy is no
doubt problematic and has the potential to lead to nearly unlimited
190
vicarious liability in extreme circumstances, critics and courts alike
have taken as a given that the scope of the conspiracy determination
is the same for purposes of applying Pinkerton as it is for the
191
evidentiary and practical trial issues that shaped the scope doctrine.
If Pinkerton’s two-part test is a constitutionally based limit, however,
then it would seem to require courts to take significantly more care in
defining the scope of a conspiracy. Basing vicarious liability on the
scope of the conspiracy as a whole is at odds with the constitutional
view of Pinkerton because it eliminates the relationship between the
defendant’s acts or agreement and the third party’s substantive
offense from the analytical equation. By focusing on the “scope” of
the conspiracy overall, a defendant may be held liable for substantive
offenses he could not have reasonably foreseen and that were not
done in furtherance of his agreement based entirely on the size of
the amorphous “scope” of the conspiracy. In these circumstances, a
defendant’s liability for other’s acts will depend on an ex-post
characterization of the group he joined, rather than whether his
187. United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 669–70 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations
omitted); see id. at 674 (“[W]e must be particularly vigilant when the government
seeks to bring many individuals under the umbrella of a single conspiracy.”).
188. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 10, at 635 (“The Pinkerton doctrine has been
used to hold an actor liable for a series of abortions performed without her
knowledge by a doctor to whom she had on other occasions referred women for
abortions.”); see also United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67–68 n.3 (D. Mass.
2003) (“Yet one must wonder where the outer limits of accomplice liability [under
Pinkerton] lie. If a person merely had loaned the robbers a ski mask that was then
used in the robbery, could he or she likewise be held responsible for murder?”).
189. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 307 (1985) (stating the law “lose[s] all
sense of just proportion if simply because of the conspiracy itself each [conspirator
is] held accountable for thousands of additional offenses of which he was completely
unaware and which he did not influence at all”).
190. See, e.g., Siesseger, supra note 170, at 1204 (noting that, in the context of a
post-9/11 terrorism case, the government “broadly characterized” a conspiracy as “al
Qaeda’s conspiracy to attack the United States”) (quotations and citations omitted).
For an insightful and illuminating analysis of some of the problems posed by broadly
defined scope in terrorism prosecutions see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy?
Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425,
469–74 (2007) (discussing prosecutions defining the scope of a conspiracy as the
global jihad movement).
191. See supra Part I (discussing the rise of the two-part Pinkerton test).
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conduct or agreement was actually linked to those additional
192
If the due process view of Pinkerton is meant to protect
crimes.
personal guilt, rather than set arbitrary limits tied to a court’s
evidentiary characterization of the breadth of a conspiracy, the
current, imprecise approach to scope is terribly problematic.
193
The well-known case Anderson v. Superior Court, frequently cited by
Pinkerton critics as an example of how a broad application of the
194
doctrine can result in potentially unbounded vicarious liability,
helps illustrate how basing vicarious liability on the scope of the
conspiracy, rather than the defendant’s conduct, is inconsistent with
Pinkerton as a due process limit. The defendant in Anderson referred
pregnant women who were seeking an abortion to a doctor in
exchange for a fee for each woman on whom he performed the
195
procedure.
The doctor had a similar arrangement with sixteen
other individuals and all were jointly indicted for conspiracy as well
196
as, vicariously, for every abortion performed by the doctor.
Anderson challenged her indictment on the ground that each
agreement between the doctor and the referring party was a separate
197
conspiracy. The court rejected this claim and held that there was a
single conspiracy, likening it to a business with a “common design” in
198
which each party plays a role in an ongoing enterprise.
Accordingly, it found that Anderson could be held vicariously liable
for all of the abortions performed in furtherance of the conspiracy,
including abortions based on referrals by other defendants in which
199
she played no part.
The result in Anderson demonstrates how applying Pinkerton based
on a court’s definition of a conspiracy, rather than each defendant’s
individual agreement or actions, can divorce liability from personal
guilt. First, though the defendant may have been able to foresee that

192. See supra Part III (discussing the personal guilt requirement that there be a
substantial relationship between a defendant’s conduct or agreement and the third
parties substantive crimes).
193. 177 P.2d 315 (1947) (limiting vicarious liability for the substantive offenses of
co-conspirators to crimes committed after the defendant joined the conspiracy),
overruled in part by People v. Weiss, 327 P.2d 527, 545 (1958).
194. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 1147 (criticizing Anderson as an example of
“the tendency of courts to regard a conspiracy as an ongoing business relationship of
indefinite scope and duration” in applying vicarious liability in a conspiracy);
Robinson, supra note 10, at 635 (describing the case as one “where the defendants’
causal connection to the harm is tenuous at best”).
195. Anderson, 177 P.2d at 315–16.
196. Id. at 315.
197. Id. at 316.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 316–17.
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the doctor was performing other abortions in general, there is no
indication she could have foreseen the extent of his business or any
particular abortion apart from the ones that resulted from her
referrals. By holding her liable for all of the doctor’s abortions based
on the scope of the “conspiracy” defined from the perspective of its
ringleader, the doctor, the court in effect made the defendant strictly
liable for the size of the operation without regard to what may have
been foreseeable to her. If Pinkerton is a constitutional floor based on
personal guilt, however, the inquiry must focus on what was
reasonably foreseeable to each defendant. Similarly, and perhaps
more importantly in this case, the defendant’s actions did not have a
causal relationship with any of the abortions that resulted from
201
referrals by other women. Those abortions may have furthered the
broadly defined “conspiracy” from the perspective of the doctor, but
had at most a “tenuous,” circumstantial relationship with the
202
defendant’s agreement and conduct.
Anderson did not directly
benefit from, or contribute to, the abortions resulting from referrals
to the doctor by other women. Her only connection to them was her
association with the doctor in general, but personal guilt requires a
substantial relationship between her agreement and the substantive
offense.
In short, as the drafters of the Model Penal Code observed,
applying the Pinkerton test to a broadly defined conspiracy, without
regard to each defendant’s knowledge of the breadth of the
conspiracy, separates vicarious liability from a defendant’s culpability
and makes him strictly liable for potentially “thousands of additional
offenses of which he was completely unaware and which he did not
203
influence at all.” Unless vicarious liability under Pinkerton is limited
to substantive offenses that were reasonably foreseeable and in
furtherance of each defendant’s conspiratorial agreement or
200. See id. at 317 (“The inference is almost compelled, if the evidence is believed,
that this petitioner knew that Stern was engaged in the commission of abortions not
casually but as a regular business and that others, like herself, had conspired with
him to further his operations.”).
201. See supra Part III (discussing causal relationship).
202. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 226 (1961) (“[T]he enquiry here must
direct itself to an analysis of the relationship between the fact of membership and the
underlying substantive illegal conduct, in order to determine whether that
relationship is indeed too tenuous to permit its use as the basis of criminal liability.”).
This is not to say that the abortions were entirely unrelated as, arguably, by
participating in the conspiracy, the defendant helped sustain the doctor’s business,
which in turn helped make the other abortions possible, but this attenuated
relationship is far from the substantial relationship between the substantive crime
and the defendant’s conduct necessary to satisfy personal guilt under Scales.
203. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 cmt. at 307 (1985).
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participation, the evidentiary and practical inquiry into the scope of
the conspiracy will improperly dictate substantive liability. This result
is far from the narrow category of vicarious liability at issue in
Pinkerton, where the substantive offenses were the actual object of the
204
defendant’s conspiratorial agreement.
More importantly, it is
incompatible with the practice of treating Pinkerton as a due process
floor based in personal guilt. It would be meaningless to speak of
Pinkerton as a constitutionally based rule if vicarious liability under its
test depends on a court’s arbitrary definition of a “conspiracy” from
its ringleader’s view rather than the defendant’s agreement. Indeed,
the notion of Pinkerton as a due process-based test only makes sense if
it focuses on the relationship between the defendant’s actual
agreement or conduct and the substantive offense.
One might argue that a broadly defined conspiracy still ensures
there is a minimum link between the defendant and each substantive
offense in as much as each offense was reasonably foreseeable and in
furtherance of the broader conspiracy of which the defendant was a
part. But this claim misses the mark. Premising vicarious liability on
the defendant’s association alone is the precise “guilt by association”
approach that the personal guilt concept forbids. If A’s only
connection to C’s crimes is that she had an illegal agreement with B,
who simultaneously had a similar illegal agreement with C, the only
relationship between A and C’s crimes is A’s remote association with
C. This is not to say that because A and C never met and did not
know of each other A could never be liable for C’s crimes. There
must, however, be a substantial relationship between A’s agreement
and C’s criminal conduct in order for A to be vicariously liable, not
merely an independently punishable association between A and B,
who is separately linked to C.
Though the practice of broadly defining a conspiracy is perhaps
most problematic when it is used as the launching point for
determining vicarious liability for additional substantive crimes, it can
also lead to strict vicarious liability for a conspiracy charge itself
under statutes that link liability to the scope or object of the illegal
agreement. As noted above, the law of determining the scope of a
conspiracy developed at a time when, “[f]rom the viewpoint of
substantive criminal law, the duration and scope of a conspiratorial
relationship [were] not of great significance” and instead were
important “only as they affect[ed] the resolution of procedural
204. See supra Part I (discussing how the liability at issue in Pinkerton was much
narrower than the doctrine as it is currently applied).
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questions.” This remains largely true to this day under federal law
with respect to liability for the conspiracy offense itself. The general
federal conspiracy statute provides for a standard maximum five-year
prison term for any offense regardless of the object or scope of the
conspiracy, unless the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, in
207
which case the maximum term is tied to the object of the offense.
There are, however, a handful of key federal statutes that have
abandoned this approach by tying a defendant’s sentence for a
208
conspiracy conviction to the object of the conspiracy.
Perhaps the most frequently employed statute in this category is
the drug conspiracy statute, which bases the maximum sentence for a
conspiracy conviction on the weight of the drugs that were the object
209
of the conspiracy.
Circuit courts are currently split over the
question of how to calculate drug weight under the conspiracy
210
The debate has recently gained renewed energy in the
statute.
211
wake of cases following Apprendi v. New Jersey, which established that
juries, not judges, must determine drug quantity as an element of a
212
conspiracy conviction under the federal drug conspiracy statute.
205. Johnson, supra note 10, at 1165–66.
206. The Model Penal Code, by contrast, generally grades punishment for the
conspiracy the same as for the object of the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1)
(1985). However, the Model Penal Code also “excludes from an agreement’s
objectives any consequences that are not actually desired by the conspirators” and
rejects Pinkerton liability. Patrick A. Broderick, Conditional Objectives of Conspiracies, 94
YALE L.J. 895, 903 (1985). An analysis of how the constitutional dimensions of
Pinkerton might impact the Model Penal Code’s approach to the definition of a
conspiracy’s object is beyond the scope of this Article.
207. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
208. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (2000) (“Any person who conspires to commit
any [money laundering] offense defined in this section or section 1957 shall be
subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense the commission of
which was the object of the conspiracy.”); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209,
212–14 (2005) (discussing statutes that specify conspiracy liability for particular
offenses as opposed to the general conspiracy statute).
209. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000) (setting forth statutory maximum sentences for
offenses based on drug weights); see also 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (providing that
individuals convicted are “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the
offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy”);
United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311–12 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining the
relationship between §§ 846 and 841).
210. Infra notes 213–214and accompanying text.
211. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
212. Id. at 490. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. Before Apprendi, the
standard practice was for the district court to determine drug quantity for purposes
of applying 21 U.S.C. § 841 and the sentencing guidelines simultaneously. Following
Apprendi, however, courts have held that the jury, rather than the district court, must
make the drug quantity determination under § 841. E.g., United States v. Promise,
255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001). In Promise, the court stated, “Apprendi dictates that in
order to authorize the imposition of a sentence exceeding the maximum allowable
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Some courts hold that drug weight must be calculated based on the
amount that was reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of each
defendant’s agreement, consistent with the approach taken by the
213
federal sentencing guidelines.
Others, however, have found that
the relevant quantity is the amount of drugs attributable to the
214
conspiracy as a whole.
Courts on both sides of this issue have treated the question purely
215
as a matter of statutory interpretation, but if Pinkerton’s test is
rooted in due process, there may be a constitutional basis for
calculating drug quantity for each defendant rather than the
conspiracy as a whole. One proponent of applying the drug
conspiracy provision based on the scope of the entire conspiracy,
Judge Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit, recently argued in a dissenting
opinion that an individualized approach would “systematically
216
undermine[] the deterrent effects of the federal drug laws.”
Specifically, he claimed that if “the punishment relates only to the
extent of the harm foreseeable to the individual, not the extent of the
harm the conspiracy actually poses,” conspiratorial conduct would go
217
“underpunish[ed].”
Judge Niemeyer’s argument, however, reveals
without a jury finding of a specific threshold drug quantity, the specific threshold
quantity must be treated as an element of an aggravated drug trafficking offense, i.e.,
charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
156–57 (footnotes omitted); see also Collins, 415 F.3d at 312–14 (reassessing the
method for calculating drug weight for purposes of § 846 in light of Apprendi).
213. See, e.g., Collins, 415 F.3d at 314 (finding that “the jury must determine what
amount of cocaine base [is] attributable to [a defendant] using Pinkerton
principles”); United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 704–05 (9th Cir. 2003)
(requiring threshold drug quantity in conspiracy cases to be individualized by the
jury using Pinkerton).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citing Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2002), for the proposition that
the finding of the amount of drugs for the conspiracy establishes the maximum
sentence for the conspirators); Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st Cir.
2002) (holding that a jury should determine the quantity of drugs attributable to a
conspiracy as a whole and then the district court should determine the amount
attributable to each defendant in applying the sentencing guidelines).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 78 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n order to
apply § 841(b) properly, a district court must first apply the principles of Pinkerton as
set forth in the relevant conduct section of the sentencing guidelines . . . to
determine the quantity of narcotics reasonably foreseeable to each co-conspirator
within the scope of his agreement.”).
216. United States v. Ferguson, No. 05-4460, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18831, at *33
(4th Cir. Aug. 8, 2007) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
217. Id. With respect to deterrence, Judge Niemeyer curiously argued that
calculating drug quantity for each co-conspirator would “allow conspiracies to
decrease their exposure by compartmentalizing their operations, segmenting
responsibilities, and otherwise keeping members from knowing the full extent of the
conspiracy.” Id. at *33–34. As Professor Katyal has noted, however, one of the chief
utilitarian aims and benefits of conspiracy law is to “reduce[] the efficiency of
criminal enterprises and combat[] group identity by creating incentives for members
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exactly why basing culpability on a broadly defined conspiracy is
problematic under the due process view of Pinkerton. Under his
approach, a defendant would be held strictly liable for the scope of
the conspiracy as a whole, without regard to what was “foreseeable” to
him or whether his actions influenced others’ conduct. In the case of
a completed conspiracy, this method would effectively supplant
Pinkerton’s test for substantive drug offenses, as any drug offense
committed by a co-conspirator would be subsumed into the
determination of the “scope” of the conspiracy. The impact in the
case of an uncompleted conspiracy would be even more pernicious,
as it would expand a defendant’s criminal liability based on nothing
more than the mere agreements of other members in the broadly
defined conspiracy.
To be sure, Pinkerton’s test may be an imperfect fit when
218
determining the scope of uncompleted conspiracies.
If a drug
conspiracy has not yet distributed any drugs, for example, it is
difficult to say which particular acts of distribution contemplated by
other conspirators are “reasonably foreseeable” or “in furtherance” of
the defendant’s agreement. However, this fact weighs in favor of
limiting the relevant scope of the conspiracy to the defendant’s actual
agreement, for convictions under statutes that base the severity of
punishment on the scope determination. As an inchoate crime, the
“gravamen of conspiracy is [the] agreement to commit a crime or
219
series of crimes” and it is difficult to see how a defendant can be
said to have agreed to illegal conduct about which he was completely
unaware (much less, conduct that he could not even have
220
foreseen). Under traditional conspiracy statutes, which provide for
a single maximum penalty regardless of the scope or object of the
conspiracy, a broadly defined conspiracy may be permissible as the
most efficient and sensible method for prosecuting the participants.
But, where the extent of criminal liability is linked to the definition of
the scope of the agreement, any expansion beyond each defendant’s
of organizations not to share information with each other.” Katyal, supra note 9, at
1353.
218. Ferguson, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18331, at *33 (“Because drug quantity must
often be calculated on a forward-looking basis in conspiracy cases, the jury must
evaluate that quantity based on the scope of the conspiratorial agreement and could
not undertake the [Pinkerton] inquiry required by Collins.”).
219. Id. at *22.
220. See Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 10, at 928 (footnote omitted) (“Courts
generally consider that a person who joins an existing criminal group becomes a
party to the same conspiracy. But if a conspiracy consists of the continuing act of the
agreement, it is difficult to see how this can be so, since the act of agreement in
which an individual participates cannot logically begin before he enters or continue
after he leaves.”).
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agreement would seem to improperly enlarge the agreement, as a
221
In any event, as a matter of
matter of statutory interpretation.
personal guilt under the Due Process Clause, a defendant should at
least be able to reasonably foresee the extent of that to which he is
agreeing.
In sum, imposing additional criminal liability by reference to the
broadly defined scope of a conspiracy relates to the same concerns
under the personal guilt requirement as the Pinkerton test itself. If
the Due Process Clause limits vicarious liability, in accordance with
Pinkerton, the limit only makes sense as a means of ensuring a
minimally substantial relationship between the defendant’s conduct
and the conduct of others. But if individuals can be held liable for
crimes and acts that they did not foresee and did not influence, based
entirely on an abstract post-hoc definition of the conspiracy as a
whole, liability would be divorced from personal guilt. Indeed, it
would be strange to speak of a “due process” limit that constrained
liability based on arbitrary factors, like a court’s determination of how
broadly evidentiary and practical considerations permit a conspiracy
to be defined. Thus, if Pinkerton’s test is indeed a constitutional
minimum, it would only seem to be a coherent one if it similarly
limits the definition of the scope of a conspiracy in instances where
the determination will lead to additional criminal liability. To ensure
a substantial relationship between the defendant’s conduct and his
co-conspirator’s actions, courts should require a particularized
determination of the scope of each defendant’s agreement and
participation in any situation where additional criminal liability is
imposed on a defendant based on the “scope” definition.
B. Felony Murder
Perhaps the area of law that first comes to mind as potentially
inconsistent with Pinkerton’s test as a due process minimum for
vicarious liability is the felony murder rule. The parallels between
the two doctrines are especially strong when the felony murder rule is
employed based on another person’s acts (whether a co-felon’s or

221. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). Indeed, Feola indicates that this
result is required where the scope or object of the conspiracy might affect a
defendant’s substantive liability. Id. at 695. The Court explained that “the
knowledge of the parties is relevant to the same issues and to the same extent as it
may be for conviction of the substantive offense.” Id. The Court also stated that its
“decisions establish that in order to sustain a judgment of conviction on a charge of
conspiracy to violate a federal statute, the Government must prove at least the degree
of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense itself.” Id. at 686.
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222

those of a person unaffiliated with the felony).
Under the classic
formulation, the felony murder doctrine began as a harsh common
law rule that “declare[d] that one is guilty of murder if death results
from conduct during the commission or attempted commission of
any felony” and thus “operated to impose liability for murder based
223
Recently, in a persuasive and exhaustively
on . . . strict liability.”
researched article, Professor Guyora Binder argued that the “harsh
‘common law’ felony murder rule” premised on strict liability is “a
224
myth” and that “the felony murder rule eventually adopted in
England was at least as mild as the ‘reformed’ law of felony murder
225
prevailing in contemporary America.”
Indeed, Professor Binder’s
research indicates that the English common law and early American
approach was likely more protective of linking murder liability to each
226
individual’s culpability than the current approach.
In any event,
today, most modern felony murder statutes limit liability to deaths
222.
A defendant may be convicted of felony murder for a death caused by
himself or another when the death occurs during the commission of one of a
number of specified felonies, even if neither the defendant nor his
confederate had any intent to kill. Under the Pinkerton doctrine, however, a
defendant may not be convicted of murder unless one of his criminal
associates, acting foreseeably and in furtherance of the conspiracy, caused
the victim’s death with the intent to do so.
State v. Diaz, 679 A.2d 902, 911 (Conn. 1996). Robinson discusses similar theoretical
justifications for Pinkerton and felony murder accomplice liability. Robinson, supra
note 10, at 665–68. For an example of liability under the felony murder doctrine for
the acts of someone who was not a co-felon, see People v. Hickman, 297 N.E.2d 582
(Ill. App. Ct. 1973). Hickman held that defendants could be held liable under the
felony murder rule where they attempted to burglarize a liquor warehouse after
hours, fled after being seen by the police, and during the ensuing foot-chase one
police officer shot and killed another police officer after mistaking the officer for
one of the defendants. Id. at 583, 586.
223. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6, at 30–31 (1980); see also People v.
Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. 598, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (“The doctrine is not limited to
those deaths which are foreseeable. Rather a felon is held strictly liable for all
killings committed by him or his accomplices in the course of the felony.”) (citations
omitted); Pauley, supra note 11, at 37 (“It is, of course, true that, in its strict commonlaw form, felony murder is based on strict liability, not on negligence.”). See generally
Binder, supra note 3, at 60–62 (describing the traditional account of the felony
murder doctrine).
224. Binder, supra note 3, at 63.
225. Id. at 64.
226. Compare id. (“Prior to the American Revolution, English courts had gone no
further than to impose murder liability on persons who (1) mistakenly killed one
person in an attempt to kill or wound another; (2) killed while defending themselves
against resistance to a crime; or (3) agreed with others to kill or wound for a criminal
purpose, one of whom then killed for that purpose.”), and id. at 65-66 (noting that
early American courts “usually required that felons kill their victims by intentionally
battering them or by engaging in some destructive act manifestly dangerous to life,
such as deliberately wrecking a train”), with Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 603 (explaining
that the felony murder rule is a strict liability rule and it does not matter whether
“the death was a natural or probable consequence” of the felony).
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that result from the commission of an enumerated felony or an
inherently dangerous felony; many others restrict the doctrine to
227
Within these
deaths that result from the act of a co-felon.
restrictions, however, courts generally hold that the rule applies to
completely accidental deaths and thus “authorizes strict liability for a
228
death that results from commission of a felony.”
Accordingly,
felony murder, as applied in many states, may permit liability that is
inconsistent with the due process concept of personal guilt.
229
In the California case People v. Fuller, for example, an officer
observed two men in the lot of a car dealership rolling two tires
230
apiece toward a Plymouth early on a Sunday morning.
As the
officer drove past the Plymouth, the men got inside and quickly took
231
off.
A high-speed chase ensued, which ended when the Plymouth
232
ran a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its driver.
An investigation revealed that the men had forcibly entered four
locked Dodge vans at the car lot and removed the spare tires from
233
234
each. They were both charged with burglary and felony murder.
Burglary was an enumerated felony under California’s first degree
felony murder statute, but the defendants argued that the law should
not apply in the case of flight from a burglary that was not itself
235
dangerous.
The court held that the plain language of the statute
permitted prosecution of the both defendants for first degree felony
236
murder. However, the court went on to discuss what it called “the
237
irrationality of applying the felony murder rule in the present case.”
The court explained that applying the felony murder rule for all
deaths occurring during a set of enumerated crimes was too broad
and encompassed felonies, like the one in Fuller, that were not
238
actually dangerous. As the court noted, the defendants committed
227. See, e.g., State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23, 30 (N.J. 1977) (citing supporting
cases and agreeing that felony murder “does not extend to a killing, although
growing out of the commission of the felony, if directly attributable to the act of one
other than the defendant or those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise”).
But see Hickman, 297 N.E.2d at 586 (holding that defendants could be held liable
under felony murder rule where the killing was by a police officer who shot and
killed another police officer after mistaking the officer for one of the defendants).
228. DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 557.
229. 150 Cal. Rptr. 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
230. Id. at 516.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 517.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 518.
238. Id. at 518–20.

630

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:585

the burglary unarmed, on a Sunday morning when the dealership was
closed, and there was no sign they expected to use violence during
239
the crime. In other words, the death was hardly a foreseeable result
240
of the defendants’ planned burglary.
Though the Fuller court did not address the issue of vicarious
liability, its decision is particularly problematic for the co-felon who
was not driving the vehicle. The driver of the car was recklessly
driving the Plymouth when he collided with the oncoming car and
killed its driver, but his co-felon could have been prosecuted under
the felony murder rule even if he had not been involved in the
241
getaway.
This point was highlighted in a subsequent California
242
case, People v. Thongvilay, where, on similar facts, two defendants
243
were convicted of felony murder. The defendants argued that the
death did not occur during the commission of the burglary because
the car chase took place after they had already left the scene and
244
reached a place of relative safety. The majority rejected this claim
245
However, a dissenting
and upheld the defendants’ conviction.
judge observed the particularly troublesome impact of applying the
felony murder rule to the non-driver co-felon. “The [State],
however,” the judge explained,
chose to prosecute this case only on a first-degree felony murder
theory, presumably because that was the only homicide theory that
would also include the passenger . . . . Because he had no control
over the car in which he was riding as a passenger, to hold [him]
responsible for first-degree felony murder based on his

239. Id. at 519.
240. Id. at 519–20 (observing that “treating the flight as part of the burglary to
bootstrap the entire transaction into one inherently dangerous to human life simply
begs the issue; flight from the scene of any crime is inherently dangerous”).
241. Id. at 520–21 (noting in dicta that the defendants could be prosecuted for
second degree murder). Though the Fuller court did not differentiate the driver and
passenger in its discussion of the second degree murder issue—likely because the
defendants did not raise any argument with respect to second degree murder—the
passenger could not have been prosecuted individually for second degree murder.
See People v. Thongvilay, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
242. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738.
243. Id. at 741. In Thongvilay, the two defendants stole a car radio and were
pursued by the boyfriend of the owner of the burglarized car. The defendants drove
through a red light attempting to elude the boyfriend and ran into another car,
killing its driver. Id.
244. Id. at 750 (McKinster, J., dissenting) (explaining that although only a few
minutes separated the defendants from the commission of the burglary and the
chase by the boyfriend, it was sufficient to sever the burglary from the car crash).
245. Id. at 743 (majority opinion).
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participation in a felony that is not inherently dangerous is a
246
manifest injustice.

Fuller and Thongvilay demonstrate the potential, even under
prevailing constraints on the felony murder rule, for a co-felon to be
held vicariously liable for a death that was not reasonably foreseeable
to him. If Pinkerton’s test is the constitutional minimum for vicarious
liability in a conspiracy, it is difficult to see why it should not also
require reasonable foreseeability for vicarious felony murder liability.
One might argue that the felony murder doctrine is inherently more
constrained than Pinkerton because a felony is usually more limited in
duration and number of participants than a conspiracy. While this
fact undoubtedly accounts for the relatively small number of
instances where felony murder is imposed for a killing that was not
foreseeable, it does not ensure a connection between the personal
guilt of each felon and the resulting death in every case. The
Pinkerton test and Scales’ personal guilt requirement are concerned
with constraining the relationship between the individual’s actions
and the wrongful act with which they are vicariously charged. The
smaller number of participants and shorter time period in a felony
may limit the reach of felony murder overall, but these limits, like the
enumerated felony limitation, are ultimately arbitrary from the
perspective of personal guilt. They do not prevent accomplices from
being held strictly liable for accidental and unforeseeable deaths that
were caused by others in all instances.
A related and more persuasive argument is that what felony
murder lacks in the way of limits based on foreseeability, it makes up
for in the area of causation. The felony murder rule generally
requires a causal relationship between the felony and resulting
247
248
death.
For example, in King v. Commonwealth, King and his
accomplice, Bailey, were flying an airplane containing over 500
pounds of marijuana through thick fog when the plane crashed into
249
a mountain, killing Bailey. King was convicted of felony murder for
Bailey’s death but the Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, finding
250
Though the
that the death had not been caused by the felony.
court acknowledged that King and Bailey were only flying the
246. See id. at 752 (McKinster, J., dissenting); see also id. (noting that “[a]s to [the
driver], the evidence might support a second degree murder conviction on an
implied malice theory and clearly supports a vehicular manslaughter charge”).
247. See DRESSLER, supra note 18, at 567 (“There must also be a causal relationship
between the felony and the homicide.”).
248. 368 S.E.2d 704 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
249. Id. at 705.
250. Id.
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airplane as part of their felonious activity, it found that the accident
itself “stemmed not from the possession or distribution of drugs, but
251
Unlike
from fog, low cloud cover, pilot error, and inexperience.”
cases involving accidental deaths during flight from a felony, there
was no indication that King and Bailey were flying recklessly to avoid
detection and, accordingly, the causation requirement was not
252
satisfied. It is worth noting that this causal requirement is analyzed
based on the felony generally rather than each felon’s participation,
and that rules like the flight doctrine expand the causal reach beyond
253
the felony itself.
Still, even in flight cases, the causation
requirement in felony murder seems at least as robust as Pinkerton’s
“in furtherance of” requirement in limiting liability. In Fuller, for
example, the reckless getaway was the direct result of the burglary
and certainly furthered the pair’s efforts to complete the crime
254
To be sure, the death may have occurred
without being caught.
even without the passenger’s participation in the felony, but the same
is true of vicarious liability under Pinkerton and Scales. Personal guilt
under Scales does not require but-for causation; so long as the
defendant influenced or attempted to influence the crime, the
“causal” relationship between the defendant and the third party’s
crime will be satisfied.
Though the “causal” link in felony murder seems at least as strong
as under Pinkerton, it is unlikely that this fact alone could save broad
applications of felony murder under the view that Pinkerton’s
vicarious liability limits are rooted in due process. As discussed
above, most courts that have held the Pinkerton test to be a
constitutional floor have focused on the foreseeability prong. As the
Sixth Circuit put it, “[t]he foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton
is also the main concern underlying a possible due process
255
violation.”
The effect is to forbid liability where a third party
unilaterally takes unusual measures to “further” the group’s goals.
This result makes sense from the perspective of personal guilt.
Without this limit, vicarious liability would depend on a co-felon or
co-conspirator’s quirky behavior rather than a relationship to the
defendant’s own wrongful conduct and state of mind. Accordingly,
251. Id. at 707–08.
252. Id. (“Had the plane been flying low or recklessly to avoid detection, for
example, the crash would be a consequence or action which was directly intended to
further the felony and a different result might obtain.”).
253. C.f. People v. Fuller, 150 Cal. Rptr. 515, 519–20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(“[F]light from the scene of any crime is inherently dangerous.”).
254. Id. at 516, 521.
255. United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991).
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though in most felony murder cases there may be a sufficient
relationship between each felon’s personal guilt and the resulting
death, the relatively small number of vicarious felony murder
convictions that are based on strict liability and involve purely
256
accidental unforeseeable deaths seem irreconcilable with Pinkerton’s
due process limits.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that vicarious liability for
unforeseeable deaths under the felony murder doctrine is
unconstitutional. One might argue that a conflict between Pinkerton
liability and felony murder only indicates that it is erroneous for
courts to treat the Pinkerton test as a due process floor for vicarious
liability. After all, felony murder has been around much longer than
Pinkerton and, under the traditional account of the felony murder
rule, it is said to been have applied even more broadly at common
law. While this Article leaves for another day the question of what
limits, if any, on vicarious criminal liability are deeply rooted in this
257
nation’s history and traditions, it is worth noting that Professor
Binder’s revisionist account of the felony murder rule indicates its
application to accomplices at common law and in early American law
was as constrained, if not more, than Pinkerton liability. His review of
nineteenth century American cases where vicarious liability was
imposed under the felony murder rule revealed that all but one case
involved instances where either “(1) some cofelons participate[d] in
a violent assault but [did] not all strike a fatal blow; [or] (2) some
cofelons participate[d] in a felony necessarily involving violence or
the imposition of risk [of death], but [did] not personally participate
258
in the fatal violence.”
In other words, early American courts
generally limited felony murder liability for accomplices to those
“participating in felonies foreseeably involving acts of violence that
259
resulted in death.”
Thus, though the argument that the
256. See, e.g., Hickman v. Commonwealth, 398 S.E.2d 698, 699 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)
(upholding a defendant’s felony murder conviction for an accidental death based on
the felony of aiding and abetting cocaine possession by placing cocaine onto a
mirror).
257. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting
that a state’s ability to carry out and define crimes “is not subject to proscription
under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental”)
(citations and internal quotations omitted).
258. Binder, supra note 3, at 199–200; see id. at 200 (noting all but one case fell
into one of these two categories).
259. Id. at 201. The common law approach to vicarious liability for felony murder
appeared to be even more limited. According to Binder, one early English case that
found vicarious murder liability was limited by requirements that
(1) the abettor must know of the malicious design of the party killing,
(2) the killing must be in pursuance of that unlawful act, and not collateral

634

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:585

Constitution permits broader vicarious liability may ultimately carry
the day, the early history of the felony murder rule does not appear
to undercut the courts that have held that Pinkerton’s limits are
260
required by due process.
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
An understanding of the constitutional dimensions of Pinkerton also
sheds new light on the most recent line of cases to draw directly upon
the due process personal guilt requirement. A provision of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) makes it a
crime to knowingly provide “material support” to a designated
261
“foreign terrorist organization.” A person convicted of violating the
provision is subject to a maximum sentence of fifteen years, but the
penalty is raised to a maximum life term “if the death of any person
262
results.”
Though the law has been in effect since 1996, before
September 11, 2001, the government only brought a handful of
263
charges under it.
Since then, the government has aggressively
employed the law and included an AEDPA “material support” charge
264
in “virtually every criminal ‘terrorism’ case that [it] has filed.”
Critics of the provision have argued that it is unconstitutional in a
to it, (3) the unlawful act ought to be deliberate, and (4) it ought to be such
an act as may tend to the hurt of another either, immediately, or by
necessary consequence.
Id. at 88–89. (quotations and citations omitted). Binder also discusses how early
felony murder cases “conditioned its application on some form of culpability,” such
as a requirement that each defendant actually participate in a foreseeably dangerous
act. Id. at 101–04.
260. See Sayre, supra note 55, at 697 (arguing that early common law “narrowly . . .
restricted criminal liability within the scope of the express command or procurement
of the accessory”).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000). Material support is defined under § 2339A(b)(1)
as
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal
substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or
include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
263. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism Support Laws and the
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 18–29 (2005) (noting that only six
people have been prosecuted for material support of terrorism between April 1996
and September 2001).
264. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003); see also Norman Abrams, The Material Support
Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 5–6 (2005) (noting that the provision has “been frequently
charged in prosecutions since September 11, 2001, becoming key elements in the
government’s anti-terrorism efforts”).
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number of respects, including that it violates the substantive due
265
process personal guilt requirement. Courts and commentators that
have addressed the personal guilt issue have focused on the level of
mens rea that should be required regarding the aims of the
organization as a whole, without separately addressing the “if death
266
results” section of the statute. Although some courts have pointed
to that part of the statute as a particular area of concern, they have
assumed that the only personal guilt question presented by the law
concerns the relationship between the defendant’s material support
and the general nature of the organization. Looking at AEDPA’s
material support provision through the lens of the Pinkerton limits,
however, indicates that the “if death results” part of the statute poses
distinct vicarious liability due process problems. Isolating this issue
may help alleviate some of the confusion surrounding the material
support provision’s constitutionality under the Due Process Clause.
The debate over the “material support” provision and personal
guilt has revolved around the level of knowledge or intent an
individual should be required to possess with respect to the illegal
aims of the designated foreign terrorist organization. Originally, the
government argued that the statute required only that an individual
know the identity of the organization she was contributing to, and
would permit strict liability if the organization was engaged in
267
terrorist activities or was officially designated as a terrorist group.
Under this approach, the government could
convict an individual who gives money to a designated organization
that solicits money at their doorstep so long as the organization
identifies itself by name. It [would be] no defense, according to
the government, that the organization describes to the donor only
its humanitarian work to provide basic services to support victims
displaced and orphaned by conflict, or to defend the cultural and
268
linguistic rights of ethnic minorities.
265. See David Henrik Pendle, Comment, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The
Material Support Offense and Personnel Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 786–87 (2007)
(noting that other arguments have included that the law is vague, overbroad, and
infringes on the right of freedom of association). For an analysis of the potential
First Amendment issues implicated by the provision, see Cole, supra note 20, at 246–
50.
266. See generally Pendle, supra note 265, at 793–807 (analyzing the “material
support” provision and arguing that the statute should be amended to a recklessness
standard in light of the due process concerns under Scales).
267. See id. at 784–85 (describing the three competing interpretations of the
statute); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Mens Rea for the Crime of Providing Material
Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 861, 872–74 (2004)
(describing the government’s position).
268. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 397 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004).
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In December 2004, Congress amended the law to clarify that “[t]o
violate [the material support law] a person must have knowledge that
the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . ., that the
organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . ., or that
269
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.” Opponents
of the law argue, however, that knowledge is insufficient to meet the
personal guilt requirement and that, as was done in Scales, courts
should interpret the provision to include a “specific intent to further
270
the terrorist activities of foreign terrorist organizations.”
On this
view, because many designated organizations engage in both illegal
and legal activity (such as providing humanitarian aid), a specific
intent requirement is necessary to ensure that individuals are not
punished on the basis of their association with, and support of, the
271
legal and protected aims of a designated organization.
Though Scales appears to provide strong support for the critics’
view, only one court has adopted the position that personal guilt
requires specific intent under AEDPA’s material support law. In
272
United States v. Al-Arian, the Middle District of Florida considered a
challenge to the law by alleged members of the Palestinian Islamic
273
Jihad (PIJ).
The defendants were alleged to have engaged in
fundraising efforts in the United States on behalf of the PIJ, a
designated terrorist organization that uses violence and threats of
violence to pressure Israel to cede territory to the Palestinian
274
people. The court pointed to the potential severity of the “if death
275
results” provision as one of the main reasons for adopting the
276
Under a knowledge standard, an
specific intent approach.

269. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000); see also Pendle, supra note 265, at 784–86
(providing a history of Congress’ amendment in light of the strict liability position).
270. Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
271. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 376–80 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Gregory, J., dissenting) (discussing Hammoud’s and the government’s arguments
and finding a need for a specific intent requirement); United States v. Al-Arian, 329
F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (concluding that a specific intent
requirement is necessary to satisfy due process concerns); Jonakait, supra note 267, at
913–14 (discussing the consequences of not having a specific intent requirement).
272. 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294.
273. Id. at 1295
274. Id. at 1295.
275. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000).
276. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (footnote omitted) (“[T]his Court has to
look no further than the text of the provision to see that the severe punishments
provided for in [the material support provision] are justified by and explicitly tied to
the criminal activity of the FTO. For example, [the law] provides for a sentence of
up to life imprisonment if the provision of material support results in the death of
any person.”). The court also emphasized the fact that Scales required specific intent
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individual who is a member of a designated organization, but opposes
its illegal activity, could be held vicariously liable for another’s death
and face life in prison if the member was a fundraiser thinking the
money would be used solely for humanitarian or educational
277
purposes. The court concluded that, under the law: “A’s criminal
liability is inextricably connected to his association with B and the
[Foreign Terrorist Organization]. Further, the level of A’s criminal
punishment is totally dependent on B’s, and other members of the
278
FTO’s, criminal conduct.”
Though the Ninth Circuit held that a
knowledge standard was sufficient to satisfy Scales, it similarly pointed
to the “if death results” term as one of the “more troubling” parts of
the statute and noted that “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress
intended to impose a life sentence on a person who did not know
279
that his or her support could go toward unlawful activities.”
Neither court, however, considered whether this troublesome part of
the law presents distinct personal guilt issues.
Viewing Pinkerton as a due process requirement indicates that the
“if death results” portion of the statute presents a personal guilt
problem distinct from the act of material support itself. Under the
material support provision, the relevant personal guilt question is
what level of mens rea is required to link the defendant to the
general illegal aims or acts of the group, in order for her conduct to
280
constitute a substantive offense.
The “if death results” part of the
statute, however, makes a defendant who already has a punishable
link to the group vicariously liable for others’ conduct. The statute’s
ambiguous wording does not clearly indicate what relationship
between the defendant’s “material support” and the death is required
to meet this element. For example, the provision could arguably be
interpreted to require a strict causal relationship, where the material
support was a but-for cause of the death. Alternatively, one might
argue that all that is required is that the organization use the support
given by the defendant to help it carry out a killing. In either case,
however, if the statute merely requires knowledge of the group’s
illegal activity there appears to be a significant danger that a
defendant could be convicted for deaths that were not reasonably
and referred to “conduct” in addition to membership in its discussion. Id. at 1299–
1300.
277. The court employed a similar but more elaborate hypothetical. Id. at 1300.
278. Id.
279. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 401 (9th Cir.
2003), vacated, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004).
280. Abrams, supra note 264, at 8 (noting that, though the provision has certain
characteristics of traditional complicity, it is a substantive offense).
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foreseeable to her. Returning to the Florida court’s example, a
defendant who knew an organization was engaged in some illegal
conduct, or was aware of its classification by the government as a
terrorist organization, could be held vicariously liable for a death
under this statute, even if he believed his support would be used only
for humanitarian purposes. Regardless of whether personal guilt
requires intent or merely knowledge to criminalize when providing
material support for an organization, it would seem to prohibit
holding a defendant strictly and vicariously liable for others’
murders. To be sure, interpreting the material support provision to
require an intent to assist in the group’s illegal activity would likely
cure this concern because, if a defendant intended to provide
material support for terrorist activity, it would presumably be
reasonably foreseeable in almost any instance that death could result.
However, the majority of courts, which have applied the knowledge
standard to the material support provision, should require more
under the “if death results” element of the law. Otherwise, a
defendant who believed she was supporting humanitarian aims of a
group that was also engaged in illegal conduct could be held strictly
liable for killings that were not reasonably foreseeable to her or done
in furtherance of her agreement or conduct.
CONCLUSION
Vicarious liability in criminal law, from Pinkerton liability to felony
murder, has been consistently and strongly criticized; courts and
commentators, however, have paid surprisingly little attention to the
question of what constraints, if any, the Constitution places on
vicarious criminal liability. This omission is all the more curious in
light of the sparse but consistent line of cases that hold that
Pinkerton’s limits constitute a due process minimum for vicarious
liability in a conspiracy, as well as the personal guilt doctrine, which
appears to bolster that approach.
While the personal guilt
requirement may not adequately address all of the objections to
vicarious liability in criminal law, it might at least eliminate some of
the most egregious and troubling applications of vicarious liability.
At the same time, while cases that have treated Pinkerton’s limits as
constitutionally based help illuminate some of the key issues in
assessing personal guilt in other vicarious liability contexts, the true
limits and nature of personal guilt under the Constitution are far
from clear. It is almost certain that the Due Process Clause would
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forbid sending A to prison for B’s crimes based entirely on the fact
281
that A and B are cousins. However, there is no coherent framework
for analyzing even moderately close questions in the area of vicarious
liability and personal guilt. This Article aims to begin addressing
these issues by providing a thorough account of the cases that have
held Pinkerton to be constitutionally required and asking how these
cases might impact other vicarious liability criminal law doctrines.
The analysis indicates that the personal guilt requirement may pose
important challenges to vicarious criminal liability in a number of
areas, including the current approach to defining “scope” in
conspiracy law, broad applications of the felony murder rule, and the
material support provision of AEDPA. The law still has a long road to
travel, however, to reach a consistent approach to personal guilt that
would allow a more definitive and reliable analysis of vicarious
criminal liability. It is my hope that this Article will help to spark a
dialogue about these important but under-examined questions.

281. Cf. New Hampshire v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38, 40 (1979) (“[W]e have no
hesitancy in holding that any attempt to impose [criminal] liability on parents simply
because they occupy the status of parents, without more, offends the due process
clause of our State Constitution.”).

